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ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)
This Ph.D. thesis is composed of four independent research papers in the ﬁeld of Market
Design. It begins with a general introduction for all four papers and ends with a brief
conclusion. In this thesis, I study the impact of heterogeneous market participants on
allocation outcomes in diﬀerent market mechanisms; in addition, how to design alternative
mechanisms that can more eﬀectively allocate scarce resources with diverse economic and
social goals.
Chapter 1 studies the impact of aﬃrmative action policies in the context of school
choice. It addresses the following two questions: what are the causes of possible perverse
consequence of aﬃrmative action policies, and when the designer can eﬀectively imple-
ment aﬃrmative actions without unsatisfactory outcomes. Using the minority reserve
policy in the student optimal stable mechanism as an example, I show that two acyclic-
ity conditions, type-speciﬁc acyclicity and strongly type-speciﬁc acyclicity, are crucial for
eﬀective aﬃrmative action policies. However, these two cycle conditions are almost impos-
sible to be satisﬁed in any ﬁnite market in practice. Given the limitation of the point-wise
eﬀectiveness in ﬁnite markets, I further illustrate that the minority reserve policy is ap-
proximately eﬀective in the sense that the probability of a random market containing
type-speciﬁc cycles converges to zero when the copies of schools grow to inﬁnite.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of how ex ante asymmetry aﬀects bidders’ equilib-
rium strategies in two popular multi-unit auction rules: uniform-price auction (UPA)
and discriminatory-price auction (DPA). I characterize the set of asymmetric monotone
Bayes–Nash equilibria in a simple multi-unit auction game in which two units of a ho-
mogeneous object are auctioned among a set of bidders. I argue that bidders’ strategic
behavior essentially comes from their diverse market positions (i.e., the winning prob-
ability and the probability of deciding the market-clearing price). That is, if a bidder
has a relatively strong market position, she has less incentive to shade her bid for the
second unit in a UPA, whereas in a DPA, weaker bidders tend to bid more aggressively
on both of two units. Following Chapter 2, Chapter 3 further analyzes and contrasts
bidders’ collusion incentives at the ex ante stage. My results indicate that the UPA is
more vulnerable to collusion than the DPA in term of the expected per-member payoﬀ and
the core-stability.
In the last chapter, I show that a variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction,
Ausubel’s clinching auction, is vulnerable to collusion in the sense that it always has a non-
empty core. I further discuss an isomorphism relation between group strategy-proofness
and non-bossiness in allocation, and the incompatibility between eﬃcient allocation and
non-bossiness in ﬁnite auction markets.
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RESUME´ (DANSK)
Denne Ph.d. afhandling best˚ar af ﬁre uafhængige forskningsartikler inden for Market
Design. Den begynder med en generel introduktion af alle ﬁre artikler og slutter med
en kort konklusion. I denne afhandling undersøger jeg heterogene markedsdeltageres
p˚avirkning af tildelingsudfaldet for forskellige markedsmekanismer; desuden undersøger
jeg, hvorledes det er muligt at designe alternative mekanismer, der mere eﬀektivt kan
afsætte knappe ressourcer med forskellige økonomiske og sociale ma˚l.
Kapitel 1 undersøges virkningen af positive særbehandlingspolitikker i forbindelse med
et faggruppevalg. Den behandler følgende to spørgsma˚l: hvad er a˚rsagerne til s˚adanne
unaturlige konsekvenser, og hvorledes kan designeren eﬀektivt gennemføre en positiv
særbehandlingspolitik uden utilfredsstillende resultater. Ved brug af mindretals forbe-
holdspolitik i elevens optimale og stabile mekanisme som et eksempel, p˚aviser jeg, at
to acykliske betingelser, skrive-speciﬁk acyklisitet og stærkt skrive-speciﬁk acyklisitet, er
afgørende for eﬀektive positive særbehandlingspolitikker. Disse to cyklusbetingelser er i
praksis næsten umulige at f˚a opfyldt i ethvert begrænset marked. I betragtning af den
punktvise begrænsning af eﬀektivitet i begrænsede markeder, illustrerer jeg yderligere,
at mindretals forbeholdspolitik er næsten eﬀektiv i den forstand, at sandsynligheden for,
at et tilfældigt marked indeholder skrive-speciﬁkke cykler nærmer sig nul, n˚ar kopier af
skolerne vokser til det uendelige.
Kapitel 2 omhandler spørgsma˚let om, hvordan forudg˚aende asymmetri p˚avirker tilbuds-
givernes ligevægtsstrategier i to populære multi-enheds auktionsregler: ensartet pris auk-
tion (uniform-price auction, UPA) og diskriminerende pris auktion (discriminatory-price
auction, DPA). Jeg karakteriserer først et sæt af asymmetriske monotone Bayes-Nash
ligevægte i en enkel multi-enheds auktion, hvor to enheder af et homogent objekt bor-
tauktioneres blandt sæt af tilbudsgivere og argumenterer for, at tilbudsgivernes strate-
giske adfærd væsentligst kommer fra deres forskellige markedsposition (dvs. den vindende
sandsynlighed og sandsynligheden for at fastlægge markedets slutpris). Det vil sige, at
hvis en tilbudsgiver har en forholdsvis stærk markedsposition, har denne et mindre in-
citament til at skjule sit bud over for en anden enhed i UPA’en, mens der for svagere
tilbudsgivere i en DPA er tendens til at byde mere aggressivt p˚a begge af to enheder.
Efter kapitel 2, kapitel 3 yderligere analyser og kontraster tilbudsgiveres incitamenter for
aftalt spil p˚a forudg˚aende trin. Mine resultater viser, at UPA er mere s˚arbar over for
aftalt spil end DPA p˚a grund af det forventede payoﬀ per medlem og grundstabiliteten i
det forudg˚aende trin.
I det sidste kapitel viser jeg, at en variant af Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auktioner, Ausubel’s
clinching auktionen, er s˚arbar over for aftalt spil i den forstand, at den altid har en
ikke-tom kerne. Jeg drøfter yderligere en isomorﬁsk relation mellem koncernens strategi-
beskyttelse og ikke-dominans i allokeringen, og uforeneligheden mellem en eﬀektiv allok-
ering og ikke-dominans i begrænsede auktionsmarkeder.
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INTRODUCTION
Market design is an emerging ﬁeld in the past few decades with wide practical successes.
Its initial motivation is to provide feasible solutions to improve extant market mechanisms
or create new markets conforming to diﬀerent social and economic objectives. Like the
relation of physics to engineering, compared with the traditional scope of mechanism
design theory, market design problems demand more attentions to the details encountered
in practice.1
In my Ph.D. thesis, I study the impact of heterogeneous market participants on allo-
cation outcomes in diﬀerent market mechanisms; in addition, how to design alternative
mechanisms that can more eﬀectively allocate scarce resources with diverse economic
and social goals.2 Two particular kinds of heterogeneity are studied in this thesis. One
comes from players’ exogenous diﬀerences, such as market incumbents and socioeconomic-
privileged groups with inherited competitive advantages. The other kind of heterogeneity
is induced by players’ coalitional strategic behavior, i.e., several players may have incen-
tives to misreport their valuations in a coordinated way, and split the coalitional gains
among themselves.
Chapter 1 (entitled “On Eﬀective Aﬃrmative Action in School Choice”) studies the
impact of aﬃrmative action policies in the context of school choice. The purpose of
aﬃrmative action in school choice is to create a more equal and diverse social environ-
ment, i.e., granting students from disadvantaged social groups preferential treatments in
1 A mechanism design problem is a speciﬁcation of a message space for each individual and an outcome
function that maps vectors of messages into social decisions and transfers. A market design problem
focuses on implementing mechanisms into particular real-world markets. I classify those markets allowing
monetary transfer as the auction design problem, and those markets without a price signal as thematching
design problem. For example, governments use open market auctions to allocate radio spectrum, timber,
electricity, and natural gas involving hundreds of billions of dollars worldwide (Milgrom, 2004, Krishna,
2009); for matching, noticeable applications include entry level labor market, school choice, paired kidney
exchanges, among others (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Roth, 2008, Kojima, 2015).
2 e.g., allocation eﬃciency, revenue optimality, budget balance, strategy-proofness, collusion-proofness,
envy-free, among others.
school admission decisions to maintain racial, ethnic or socioeconomic balance. Recent
evidences from both academia and practice, however, indicate that implementing aﬃrma-
tive action policies in school choice problems may induce substantial welfare loss on the
purported beneﬁciaries (Kojima, 2012, Hafalir et al., 2013, Ehlers et al., 2014, Fragiadakis
and Troyan, 2015). Using the minority reserve policy (Hafalir et al., 2013) in the student
optimal stable mechanism (SOSM)(Gale and Shapley, 1962, Abdulkadirog˘lu, 2005) as an
example, this paper addresses the following two questions: what are the causes of such
perverse consequence, and when the designer can eﬀectively implement aﬃrmative action
policies without unsatisﬁed outcomes.
The minimal requirement of an eﬀective aﬃrmative action is that it should not make
at least one minority student strictly worse oﬀ, while leaves all the rest minority students
weakly worse oﬀ. I ﬁrst show that a variant of the Ergin-acyclicity structure (Ergin,
2002), type-speciﬁc acyclicity, is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee this minimal eﬀec-
tiveness criterion in a stable matching mechanism. Next, I introduce a more demanding
eﬀectiveness criterion which requires implementing a (stronger) aﬃrmative action does
not harm any minority students. I show that a stable mechanism makes no minority
students strictly worse oﬀ if and only if the matching market is strongly type-speciﬁc
acyclic. These two ﬁndings clearly reveal the source of perverse aﬃrmation actions in
school choice, which also imply that such adverse eﬀects are not coincidences but rather a
fundamental property concealed in the market structures. I then response to the second
question such that when the designer can eﬀectively implement aﬃrmative action policies
without unsatisﬁed outcomes. My results imply that the real-world school choice markets
are almost impossible to be neither type-speciﬁc acyclic nor strongly type-speciﬁc acyclic.
Given the limitation of the point-wise eﬀectiveness in ﬁnite markets, I further illustrate
that the minority reserve policy is approximately eﬀective in the sense that the probabil-
ity of a random market containing type-speciﬁc cycles converges to zero as the copies of
schools grow to inﬁnite. At the policy level, these results suggest that instead of discrim-
inating majority students through aﬃrmative actions, i.e., exchanging the welfare gain of
some minority students from impairing other students, an alternative policy practice to
rebalance education opportunities is to increase the supply of high-quality schools.
Chapter 2 (entitled “Multi-unit Auction with Ex Ante Asymmetric Bidders: Uniform
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vs Discriminatory”) addresses the question of how ex ante asymmetry aﬀects bidders’
equilibrium strategies in two popular multi-unit auction rules: uniform-price auction
(UPA) and discriminatory-price auction (DPA). Partly because of their intrinsic analytic
complexity, most existing literature of multi-unit auctions is restricted to the symmetric
environment in which all bidders have identical value distributions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn, 1998a,b, Chakraborty, 2006, McAdams, 2006, Bresky, 2008). Symmetry gives a
proper abstraction of the complex market environment when there are many small bidders.
However, in circumstances with only a handful of qualiﬁed bidders (e.g., procurement
auctions), asymmetry may become a more reasonable assumption.
This paper studies an auction market in which two units of an identical and indivisible
good are sold to a set of ex ante asymmetric bidders, each with diminishing marginal values
for the successive units. I say a bidder is stronger in the sense that she is more likely to
have higher values for both units of the good than a weaker bidder, and vice versa. Such a
feature is captured by imposing a standard conditional stochastic dominance property to
bidders’ value distributions.3 I argue that bidders’ distinct strategic behavior essentially
comes from their diverse market positions (i.e., the winning probability and the probability
of deciding the market-clearing price). Instead of deriving a system of diﬀerential ﬁrst-
order conditions for the DPA and the UPA, which quickly becomes intractable given its
multi-dimensional nature, I identify the comparative statics of equilibrium sets between
two asymmetric bidders through the changes of their relative market positions. In brief,
my results show that if a bidder has a relatively strong market position, she has less
incentive to shade her bid for the second unit in a UPA; whereas in a DPA, weaker
bidders tend to bid more aggressively on both of two units.
Following Chapter 2, Chapter 3 (entitled “Ex Ante Coalition in Multi-unit Auctions”)
further investigates and contrasts bidders’ collusion incentives in the UPA and the DPA
at the ex ante stage. I am interested in which of the two auction mechanisms is more
likely to boost collusion incentives by investigating bidders’ ex ante formation of coalitions
as bidding rings (Marshall et al., 1994, Waehrer, 1999, Bajari, 2001, Kim and Che, 2004,
Biran and Forges, 2011).4
3 See, for example, Lebrun (1999), Waehrer (1999), Maskin and Riley (2000) and Cantillon (2008),
which have used this property to study asymmetric single-unit auctions.
4 A bidding ring is composed of a group of bidders whom agree to collude together in order to gain
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I ﬁrst contrast bidders’ collusion incentives from the perspective of the expected per-
member payoﬀ. I argue that the UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than the DPA as
each bidder’s expected payoﬀ is unanimously increasing (resp. decreasing) in the UPA
(resp. DPA) with the size of the coalition she belongs to. However, higher expected
per-member payoﬀs still cannot prevent bidders’ joint incentives to deviate from their
current coalitions. I further shows that regardless of the sizes of their current coalitions
in the UPA, no subgroups of bidders would like to collectively deviate from their current
coalition once it is formed; by contrast, except for the grand coalition, all bidders would
prefer staying in a smaller coalition to their current current coalitions in the DPA. These
results contribute to the literature by providing new evidences in the choice between the
UPA and the DPA apart from comparing their revenue diﬀerence, which also oﬀer new
insights into the regulation of anti-competitive behavior in auction markets beyond the
single-unit case.
Chapter 4 (entitle “Stable Coalition in Multi-item Auctions”) illustrates the coalition
formation processes in a variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, the Ausubel’s
clinching auction (Ausubel, 2004). Compared with the commonly used simultaneous
sealed-bid auctions in markets with multiple objectives (e.g., the uniform-price auction
and the discriminatory-price auction), the clinching auction oﬀers an open ascending-bid
alternative with a clear improvement in allocation eﬃciency while maintaining simplicity
to perform in practice.
The primary motive of this paper is to explore whether colluders can cooperatively
facilitate a feasible revenue division scheme among themselves in auction markets with
multiple non-identical objects.5 I ﬁrst show that the clinching auction is vulnerable to
collusion in the sense that it always has a non-empty core, i.e., all colluders perceive higher
returns from staying in the current coalition compared to all other alternatives. Under a
mild super-additive assumption of the coalition gains, the grand coalition containing all
bidders will eventually be formed in equilibrium regardless of the former divisions of sub-
higher surplus by depressing competition in the grand auction.
5 Notice that diﬀerent from the multi-unit auctions with more than one unit of a homogeneous good
on sale, the objects are not necessarily identical to each other in multi-item auctions. Some prominent
real-life examples include selling advertisement slots for search engines, FCC spectrum auctions, among
others.
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coalition groups.6 Thus, although the clinching auction guarantees eﬃcient allocations as
the VCG auction, caution should be exercised when applying it in markets where secret
coalitions are highly suspicious. I further argue that a non-bossy condition (Satterthwaite
and Sonnenschein, 1981) is crucial to such vulnerability, and illustrate the intrinsic tension
among eﬃciency, truthfulness, and non-bossiness in auction mechanisms.
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1. ON EFFECTIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SCHOOL CHOICE
Yun Liu∗
Abstract: Recent evidence, from both academia and practice, indicates that implement-
ing aﬃrmative action policies in school choice problems may induce substantial welfare
losses on the intended beneﬁciaries. This paper addresses the following two questions:
what are the causes of such perverse consequences, and when we can eﬀectively implement
aﬃrmative action policies without unsatisfactory outcomes. Using the minority reserve
policy in the student optimal stable mechanism as an example, I show that two acyclic-
ity conditions, type-speciﬁc acyclicity and strongly type-speciﬁc acyclicity, are crucial for
eﬀective aﬃrmative action policies. I also illustrate how restrictive these two acyclicity
conditions are, and the intrinsic diﬃculty of embedding diversity goals into stable mecha-
nisms. Under some regularity conditions, I demonstrate that the minority reserve policy
is approximately eﬀective in the sense that the market is type-speciﬁc acyclic with a high
probability when the number of schools is suﬃciently large.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C78; D61; I20
Keywords: school choice, aﬃrmative action, deferred acceptance, type-speciﬁc acyclicity,
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1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of aﬃrmative action policies in the context of school choice.1
Albeit controversial, the purpose of aﬃrmative action in school choice is to create a
more equal and diverse environment, i.e., granting students from disadvantaged social
groups preferential treatments in school admission decisions to maintain racial, ethnic or
socioeconomic balance.
One popular design in practice is the quota-based aﬃrmative action (majority quota,
henceforth) (Abdulkadirog˘lu, 2005), which sets a maximum number less than the school’s
capacity to majority students and leaves the diﬀerence to minority students (i.e., the
policy-targeted student type).2 However, Kojima (2012) reports that majority quota may
actually hurt every minority student. Evidence from the real world also raises suspicion
towards the legitimacy of majority quota.3 Recently, Hafalir et al. (2013) propose an alter-
native policy design, the reserve-based aﬃrmative action (minority reserve, henceforth),
which gives minority students preferential treatment up to the reserves. Hafalir et al.
(2013) indicate that in term of students’ welfare, minority reserve is a better candidate
over its quota-based counterpart.
Although Kojima (2012) and Hafalir et al. (2013) have adequately compared the wel-
fare eﬀects among diﬀerent aﬃrmative action designs, it remains unclear what the exact
1 Traditionally, children were assigned to a public school in their immediate neighborhood. However,
as wealthy families move to the neighborhoods close to schools with better qualities, such neighborhood-
based school assignment may eventually led to socioeconomically segregations. Parents without such
means have to send their children to their assigned neighborhood schools, regardless of the quality or
other appropriateness of those schools. As a result of these concerns, school choice policies are imple-
mented to grant parents the opportunity to choose the school their child will attend. Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003) seminally reconstruct the school choice problem from a mechanism design perspective.
They illustrate that some mechanisms used in practice had shortcomings, and propose two celebrated
algorithms: the student optimal stable mechanism based on the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and
Shapley, 1962), and the top trading cycles mechanism based on (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). See Roth
and Sotomayor (1990), Roth (2008) and So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) for more dedicated reviews of this
problem.
2 For simplicity, we call the policy-targeted student type as minority student, and all the other student
types as majority student. However, the distinction between the majority type and the minority type does
not depend on race or other single social-economic status; meanwhile, the number of minority students
is not necessarily less than majority students.
3 For example, a parent in Louisville (KY) sued the school district after her kid was rejected by a school
because of racial classiﬁcation. “There was room at the school. There were plenty of empty seats. This
was a racial quota” (http://goo.gl/VA8PkK). A more recent sue case is about the admissions policies
of University of Texas, where an applicant claims that many minority students who were admitted had
lower grades and test scores than she did (http://goo.gl/7A5DVk).
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causes of such perverse consequence are. Moreover, I am also curious about whether
and when we can eﬀectively implement aﬃrmative action policies without unsatisfactory
outcomes. This paper addresses these two concerns through a detailed scrutiny of the mi-
nority reserve policy in the student optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) (Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez, 2003). The popularity of SOSM emerges from two aspects: (i) in theory,
it produces the most desirable matching outcome among all stable mechanisms for stu-
dents,4 and is strategy-proof for students (Roth, 1984);5 (ii) it is also relatively easier to
be understood by policy makers and market participants (i.e., students and schools).
1.1.1 Main Results
The minimal requirement of an eﬀective aﬃrmative action is that a (stronger) aﬃrma-
tive action should not make some minorities match with their less preferred schools,
while leaving other minorities indiﬀerent compared to their previous matching without
the (stronger) aﬃrmative action.6 I ﬁrst show that a variant of the acyclicity structure
(Ergin, 2002), type-speciﬁc acyclicity, is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee this minimal
eﬀectiveness criterion in a stable mechanism (Theorem 1.1).7 I then introduce a more de-
manding eﬀectiveness criterion which requires that implementing a (stronger) aﬃrmative
action does not harm any minority students.8 I show that a stable mechanism makes no
minority students strictly worse oﬀ if and only if there is no quasi type-speciﬁc cycle in
the priority orders of schools over students (Theorem 1.2). Theorem 1.1 and Theorem
1.2 clearly reveal the source of perverse aﬃrmative actions in school choice. In addition,
these two results also indicate that the adverse eﬀects—as illustrated by the examples in
4 A matching mechanism is stable if there are no individual players (i.e., students or schools) will
prefer to be unmatched, or a pair of players who prefer to be matched with each other to their current
assignments.
5 A matching mechanism is strategy-proof if no students have incentive to deviate from reporting their
true preference orders.
6 Kojima (2012) employs this weak welfare condition to analyze the majority quota policy, and names
it as respect the spirit of quota-based aﬃrmative action.
7 Ergin (2002) says that a priority structure (which comprises a pair of schools’ priorities and their
corresponding capacities) is acyclic, if it never gives rise to situations where a player can block a potential
settlement between any other two players without aﬀecting her own position. See the formal deﬁnition
as well as discussions of its relation with my two type-speciﬁc acyclicity conditions in Section 1.3.1.
8 Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) say that a matching mechanism respects improvements if a student is
never strictly worse oﬀ when her priority ranking is improved in some schools while the relative rankings
among other students are unchanged. I extend Balinski and So¨nmez (1999)’s notion to incorporate the
analysis of students with diﬀerent types. See the formal deﬁnition in Section 1.2.2.
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Kojima (2012) and simulations in Hafalir et al. (2013)—are not coincidences, but rather
a fundamental property concealed in the priority structures.
Theorem 1.3 addresses my second question, when we can eﬀectively implement aﬃr-
mative action policies without unsatisfactory outcomes. I show that priority structures
in practice are very unlikely to be neither type-speciﬁc acyclic nor strongly type-speciﬁc
acyclic. This ﬁnding suggests that even if helping disadvantaged social groups is deemed
desirable for the society, caution should be exercised when applying aﬃrmative action to
rebalance education opportunities among diﬀerent social groups. I further link a matching
problem to a directed graph, where each student represents a vertex and the ranking of
two adjacent students in each school’s priority as an edge. I argue that the presence of
various cycle conditions in most extant mechanisms essentially describe the paths (i.e., a
sequence of edges) and cycles (if a path has the same initial and terminal vertex) inherited
in schools’ diverse priority orders. With the almost inevitable presence of paths in most
real-life priority structures, the room left for eﬀective aﬃrmative actions through a simple
amendment of extant mechanisms may be limited.
Given the limitation of the point-wise eﬀectiveness in ﬁnite matching markets, I further
illustrate that the minority reserve policy is approximately eﬀective in the sense that the
probability of a random market containing type-speciﬁc cycles converges to zero when the
copies of schools grow to inﬁnite (Theorem 1.4). Thus, instead of discriminating majority
students through aﬃrmative actions (i.e., exchanging the welfare gain of some minor-
ity students from impairing other students), an alternative policy practice to rebalance
education opportunities is to increase the supply of high-quality schools.
Last, although this paper exclusively focuses on the implementation of minority re-
serve policy in SOSM, my type-speciﬁc notions can serve as a benchmark to analyze the
performance of aﬃrmative actions in other matching mechanisms. In addition, because
my goal is to reveal the source of perverse aﬃrmative action policies, two student types
are suﬃcient to depict the eﬀect of inter-type rejection chains. Results in this paper
can be seamlessly developed into aﬃrmative action policies with more than two types of
students.
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1.1.2 Related Literature
Incorporating diversity concerns into school choice mechanisms have drawn some attention
in recent years. Besides the literature mentioned previously, Ehlers et al. (2014) propose
an alternative mechanism to accommodate aﬃrmative action with both maximum and
minimum quota and cases when quotas are either hard or soft. Erdil and Kumano (2012)
study a class of allocation rules that allow schools to have indiﬀerent priorities over the
same type of students. Echenique and Yenmez (2012) axiomatize a class of substitutable
priority rules that allow schools to express preferences for diversity. However, none of
these works have clearly answered the two questions I addressed in this paper. In addition,
Braun et al. (2014) and Klijn et al. (2016) contrast the performance of minority reserve
policy and majority quota in laboratories. Other papers study real-world implementations
of aﬃrmative action include the German university admissions system (Westkamp, 2013),
and the study of Brazilian public federal universities (Aygu¨n and Bo, 2013), among others.
The literature on market design in large markets has been growing rapidly in the past
the decade. The two papers that are mostly close to my setting is Kojima and Pathak
(2009) and Kojima et al. (2013). Kojima and Pathak (2009) deﬁne a rejection chain
algorithm which begins from a school’s strategic rejection of a student to initiate a chain
of subsequent rejection and acceptance, and ﬁnally receive a more desirable student to
apply the manipulator. They show that as the size of the market becomes large, such chain
eﬀect (initiated by a school’s strategic rejection of a student) is unlikely to return a more
desirable student to that school. Therefore, schools expect to match with the same set of
students with a high probability. Kojima et al. (2013) further extend the model to analyze
the National Resident Matching Program with two types of doctors, single and couple.
Another distinct literature strand considers large matching markets with randomization,
which enables the analysis of ordinal preferences by assuming a continuum economy as
the limit case. See, for example, Che and Kojima (2010) and Che and Tercieux (2015),
among others.
Dog˘an (2016) independently studies a similar problem as this paper and reaches some
similar conclusions. In particular, he gives an analogous cycle structure to elaborate
the ineﬀective implementation of minority reserve policy in SOSM, which corresponds
to my type-speciﬁc cycle notion. However, there are several major diﬀerences. First,
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the constructions of cycle structures are quite diﬀerent. While Dogan characterizes a
cycle through a chain of direct rejections of students from their original matched schools,
my type-speciﬁc notion treats the presence of a cycle as the results of inter-type rejection
chains after an auxiliary split procedure of schools’ capacities based on their reserve seats.
Second, in addition to respecting the spirit of a stronger minority reserve policy, I also
introduce another welfare criterion, respecting the improvement of a stronger minority
reserve, which requires that the improvement of some minorities’ welfare should not be
based on the welfare loss of some other minorities. Although Dogan’s amendment of
SOSM with minority reserve respects the spirit of a stronger minority reserve, it is not
compatible with my second welfare criterion. Last, Dogan’s mechanism also arises the
strategic concern from students side,9 which largely obscures the true eﬀectiveness of an
aﬃrmative action policy. My discussions of approximate eﬀectiveness in large markets
(Section 1.4) may oﬀer an alternative theoretical remedy to such strategic concern, which
I believe also has stand-alone value.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the model and introduces
the SOSM with minority reserve. Section 1.3 presents the two acyclicity conditions and
their relations with possible welfare loss. Section 1.4 further discusses the approximate
eﬀective aﬃrmative action in large market. Section 1.5 concludes the paper. All proofs
are clustered in Appendix 1.6 and 1.7.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
Let there be a set of students S, |S| ≥ 3,10 and a set of schools C, |C| ≥ 2. There are two
types of students, majority and minority. S are partitioned into two sets depend on their
types. Denote SM as the set of majority students, and Sm as the set of minority students,
S = SM ∪Sm and SM ∩Sm = ∅. Each student s ∈ S has a strict preference order Ps over
the set of schools and being unmatched (denoted by s), that is complete, transitive, and
9 i.e., students can beneﬁt from misreporting their preferences. Since Dogan’s mechanism is based on
the idea of Kesten (2010), in order to mitigate the welfare losses for minorities, it bears the cost of losing
strategy-proofness for students in complete information environments as is the case in Kesten (2010).
10 Throughout, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
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antisymmetric. All students prefer to be matched with some school instead of themselves,
c Ps s, for all s ∈ S. Each school c ∈ C has a total capacity of qc seats, qc ≥ 1, and a strict
priority order c over the set of students which is complete, transitive, and antisymmetric.
Student s is unacceptable by a school if e c s, where e represents an empty seat in school
c.11 Denote the upper contour set of c at student s as Uc(s) = {s′ ∈ S|s′ c s}.
A market is a tuple Γ = (S,C, P,, q), where P = (Pi)i∈S, = (c)c∈C and q =
(qc)c∈C . Denote P−i = (Pj)j∈S\i and −c= (c′)c′∈C\c. For a given Γ, assume that all
components, except the vector of students’ preference orders P , is commonly known.12
We call the priority order and capacity pair (, q) as a priority structure.
A matching μ is a mapping from S ∪C to the subsets of S ∪C such that, for all s ∈ S
and c ∈ C:
1. μ(s) ∈ C ∪ {s};
2. μ(c) ⊆ S and |μ(c)| ≤ qc;
3. μ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ μ(c).
That is, a matching speciﬁes the school where each student is assigned or matched
with herself, and the set of students assigned to each school. Given two matchings μ and
μ′, μ Pareto dominates μ′ if (i) μ(s)Psμ′(s) for at least one s ∈ S, and (ii) μ(s)Rs μ′(s) for
all s ∈ S, where Rs represents two matched schools are equally good for s. A matching μ
is Pareto eﬃcient if it is not Pareto dominated by any another matchings.
A matching μ is individually rational if for each student s ∈ S, μ(s)Pss, and for each
c ∈ C, (i) |μ(c)| ≤ qc and (ii) s c e for every s ∈ μ(c). A matching μ is blocked by a pair
of student s and school c if s strictly prefers c to μ(s) and either (i) c strictly prefers s to
some s′ ∈ μ(c), or (ii) |μ(c)| < qc and s is acceptable to c.13 A matching is stable if it is
individually rational and unblocked by a pair of (s, c).
A mechanism f is a function that produces a matching f(Γ) for each market Γ.14 We
11 i.e., school c prefers to reserve an empty seat instead of accepting s.
12 That is, only students are strategic players in the school choice problem, which is diﬀerent from the
school admission problem, where schools’ priority orders are also private information.
13 In other words, the student s in the pair prefers school c over his assignment in μ, and school c prefers
s either because it has a vacant seat or s is more preferred than another student assigned to c under μ.
14 I sometimes use f(Γ) and μ interchangeably to represent the matching outcome in market Γ, if no
confusion arises.
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say a mechanism is eﬃcient if there is no matching that Pareto dominates f(Γ) for any Γ.
Similarly, a stable mechanism is a mechanism that yields a stable matching with respect
to reported preferences for every market.
1.2.2 Reserve-based Aﬃrmative Action
A market Γ implements a minority reserve policy when some schools are required to
reserve some of their seats to minority students. In particular, if the number of tentatively
accepted minorities is less than a school’s reserved seats, then all minority students are
more preferred to all majority students in that school, while the ranking of each student
remains unchanged within her own type.15
Since the set of students is ﬁxed, I rewrite the market as Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)), where
rm is the corresponding vector of minority reserves for each school c. Market Γ˜ = (C, P,
, (q, r˜m)) is said to have a stronger minority reserve than Γ, if the total capacity q of each
school keeps unchanged, but r˜mc ≥ rmc for every c ∈ C, and r˜mc > rmc for some c ∈ C.
Aﬃrmative action policies intend to improve the matches of minority students, some-
times at the expense of majority students. I thus need some additional type-speciﬁc criteria
to evaluate the welfare impact of implementing diﬀerent aﬃrmative action policies. Given
two matchings μ and μ′, μ Pareto dominates μ′ for minorities if (i) μ(s)Rsμ′(s) for all
s ∈ Sm, and (ii) μ(s)Psμ′(s) for at least one s ∈ Sm.
Individual rationality is not aﬀected by the presence of minority reserve. A matching
μ is blocked by a pair of student s and school c with minority reserve, if s strictly prefers
c to μ(s) and either |μ(c)| < qc and s is acceptable to c, or
1. if s ∈ Sm, c strictly prefers s to some s′ ∈ μ(c);
2. if s ∈ SM and |μ(c) ∩ Sm| > rm, c strictly prefers s to some s′ ∈ μ(c);
3. if s ∈ SM and |μ(c) ∩ Sm| ≤ rm, c strictly prefers s to some s′ ∈ μ(c) ∩ SM .
Condition (1) describes a situation where a pair of school of student (c, s) forms a
blocking pair because s is a minority student and c prefers s to some tentatively matched
15 One distinctive feature of minority reserve is that it is not as rigid as the majority quota. If there are
not enough minority students to ﬁll the reserves, majority students are still acceptable up to this school’s
capacity.
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students in c. In condition (2), whereas blocking happens because s is a majority student,
the number of minority students in c exceeds minority reserves and c prefers s to some
students in c. Finally, in condition (3), (c, s) has a blocking pair because s is a majority
student, the number of minority students in c does not exceed minority reserves, but c
prefers s to some majority students in c. A matching is stable if it is individually rational
and unblocked by a pair of (s, c) with minority reserve.
Hafalir et al. (2013) compose the following mechanism to accommodate the SOSM
with minority reserve (SOSM-R henceforth):
• Step 1: Start from the matching where no student is matched. Each student i applies to
her ﬁrst-choice school. Each school c ﬁrst accepts up to rmc minorities with the highest
priorities if there are enough minority students on the waiting list. Then it accepts
students from the remaining applications with the highest priorities until its capacity
is ﬁlled or the applicants are exhausted. The rest (if any) are rejected.
...
• Step n: Each student i who was rejected in Step (n − 1) applies to her next highest
choice (if any). Each school c considers these students and students who are tentatively
held from the previous step together. c ﬁrst accepts up to rmc minorities with the
highest priorities if there are enough minority students on the waiting list. Then it
accepts students from the remaining applications with the highest priorities until its
capacity is ﬁlled or the applicants are exhausted. The rest (if any) are rejected.
The algorithm terminates either when every student is matched to a school or every
unmatched student has been rejected by every acceptable school. The algorithm always
terminates in a ﬁnite number of steps. Denote the new mechanism, SOSM-R, by fR, and
its outcome under market Γ by fR(Γ).16
Example 1.1: Consider the following market Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)). Let C = {c1, c2} and
S = {s1, s2, s3}, Sm = {s2, s3} and SM = {s1}. The priority orders and (type-speciﬁc)
16 Note that SOSM-R is a special case of SOSM. When no school has reserved seats, SOSM-R is
equivalent to SOSM.
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capacities of schools are
cl : s1, s2, s3 (qcl , rmcl ) = (1, 0) l = 1, 2
Students preference orders are
Psi : c1, c2 i = 1, 3
Ps2 : c2, c1
The matching produced by SOSM (or equivalently, SOSM-R without aﬃrmative ac-
tion) is
fGS(Γ) =
⎛
⎝ c1 c2
s1 s2
⎞
⎠
which leaves s3 unmatched. If implement a (stronger) minority reserve policy q˜c1 =
(qc1 , r˜
m
c1
) = (1, 1), while c2 is unaﬀected, SOSM-R produces
fR(Γ˜) =
⎛
⎝ c1 c2
s2 s1
⎞
⎠
Obviously, the stronger aﬃrmative action with r˜mc1 = 1 causes both the minority
student s2 and the majority student s1 strictly worse oﬀ compare to the previous outcome
without aﬃrmative action, while the other minority student s3 is indiﬀerent before and
after implementing r˜mc1 . The matching outcome f
R(Γ˜) is Pareto dominated by fGS(Γ) for
minorities.
Since the purpose of aﬃrmative action policy is to improve students’ welfare from the
policy-targeted type (i.e., minority student in this paper), the Pareto dominated outcome
as is the case in Example 1.1 should be avoided. I introduce the following two welfare
criteria to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a stronger minority reserve policy.
Deﬁnition 1.1: A mechanism f respects the spirit of a stronger minority reserve r˜m, if for
any given pair of markets Γ and Γ˜ such that Γ˜ has a stronger minority reserve than Γ, no
matching f(Γ˜) is Pareto dominated by f(Γ) for minorities.
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Deﬁnition 1.1 implies that implementing a stronger minority reserve policy should
never make some minority students strictly worse oﬀ, while leaving the rest of the minority
students indiﬀerent. This idea is introduced by Kojima (2012) to study the performance
of majority quota policy, which serves as the minimum welfare requirement in this paper.
Deﬁnition 1.2: A mechanism f respects the improvement of a stronger minority reserve
r˜m, if for any given pair of markets Γ and Γ˜ such that Γ˜ has a stronger minority reserve
than Γ, no minority student is strictly worse oﬀ in f(Γ˜) than in f(Γ).
Deﬁnition 1.2 requires that the possible welfare improvement of some minority stu-
dents should not be based on the welfare loss of any other minorities. It provides a
stronger welfare criterion compare to the preceding one, which also generalizes the re-
spect of improvements condition (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) to matching markets with
diﬀerent student types.
Remark 1.1: If a mechanism respects improvements, then it also respects the improvement
of a stronger minority reserve. In addition, if a mechanism respects the improvement of
a stronger minority reserve, then it also respects the spirit of a stronger minority reserve.
The next step is to introduce the following modiﬁed market which produces the same
matching as the original market with SOSM-R. In a market (C, P,, (q, rm)), split each
school c with capacity qc and minority reserve r
m
c into two corresponding sub-schools,
original sub-school (co) and reserve sub-school (cr). Let Cm be the set of schools with
both co and cr. co has a capacity of qc−rmc and maintains the original priority order c.17
cr has a capacity of rmc and its new priority rc is
rc ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
s c s′ if s, s′ ∈ Sm
s c s′ if s, s′ ∈ SM
s rc s′ if s ∈ Sm, s′ ∈ SM
cr keeps the same pointwise priority orders as school c in the original market for all
majority students and all minority students respectively, but prefers all minorities to any
17 If a school c is not aﬀected by minority reserve, then co is equivalent to c after the split procedure.
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majorities. For each student, if c1Psc2 in the original market, her preference in the new
market is
cr1 P
′
s c
o
1 P
′
s c
r
2 P
′
s c
o
2 ∀s ∈ Sm
co1 P
′
s c
r
1 P
′
s c
o
2 P
′
s c
r
2 ∀s ∈ SM
That is, (i) I preserve the same preference orders over schools in the new market,
and assume that (ii.a) each minority student prefers the reserve sub-schools (cr) over the
original sub-schools (co); whereas (ii.b) each majority prefers co over cr.
Denote the new market as Γm = (Cm, P ′, (o,r), (q, rm)), where x= (xc )c∈C , x =
o, r, and its matching outcome through SOSM is fGS(Γm). Let ((o,r), (q, rm)) be the
corresponding priority structure of (, q) in Γm.
Claim 1.1: For each market Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)) and its corresponding Γm = (Cm, P ′, (o
,r), (q, rm)), fR(Γ) = fGS(Γm).
Hafalir et al. (2013) give a similar split procedure and indicate that SOSM generates
the same matching outcome in Γm as the SOSM-R in Γ. The only diﬀerence is that
Hafalir et al. (2013) let all students ﬁrst apply to the reserve sub-school cr, whereas I
assume majority students prefer the original sub-school co to the reserve sub-school cr in
each school c. As I maintain the relative rankings of each original school in Γm while all
students are only tentatively accepted in each corresponding sub-schools after the split
procedures, a diﬀerent application order (between co and cr) within each c will not change
the ﬁnal outcome.
1.3 Two Acyclicity Conditions
Although Hafalir et al. (2013) imply a clear welfare improvement of SOSM-R for minority
students over embedding majority quota with SOSM, SOSM-R may still produce ineﬀec-
tive outcomes such as the case of Example 1.1. My ﬁrst task is to understand the cause
of such adverse eﬀects on minority students.
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Deﬁnition 1.3: Given a priority structure (, (q, rm)) and its corresponding ((o,r), (q, rm)),
a type-speciﬁc cycle is constituted of k+1 distinct schools c0, c1, . . . , ck, and k+2 distinct
students si, sj, sk, sl where si, sk ∈ Sm, sj ∈ SM and sl = {s1, s2, . . . , sk−1} ∈ S, k ≥ 1, if
the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(C) Cycle condition: sk rc0 si rc0 sj xc1 s1 xc2 s2 . . . sk−1 ock sk, such that x = o
if sl ∈ Sm, and x = r if sl ∈ SM , l = {1, . . . , k − 1}.
(S) Scarcity condition: There exist k+1 disjoint sets of students Sc0 , Sc1 , . . . , Sck ⊂
S\{si, sj, sk, s1, s2, . . . , sk−1}, such that |Sc0 | = qc0 − 1, |Scl | = qcl − 1, Sc0 ⊂ U rc0(sj) ∪
U oc0(si), Scl ⊂ U ocl(sl) ∪ U rcl(sl), l = {1, . . . , k − 1}. Uxc (s) = {s′ ∈ S|s′ xc s}, x = o, r.
((o,r), (q, rm)) is type-speciﬁc acyclic if it has no type-speciﬁc cycles.
Condition (C) indicates a chain of rejections and acceptances with a group of distinct
schools and students which is initiated by a majority student (sj) and is terminated by
a minority student (sk) whom applies to the initial school rejected the majority student.
Condition (S) excludes the situation that students are exhausted before ﬁlling up all
seats.18
Lemma 1.1: For a market Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)) and its corresponding Γm = (Cm, P ′, (o
,r), (q, rm)), let μ and μ˜ be the matching outcomes of SOSM-R before and after a
stronger aﬃrmative action policy r˜m. If μ˜(s) is Pareto dominated by μ(s) for all s ∈ Sm,
then μ˜(s) is Pareto dominated by μ(s) for all s ∈ S.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.1. 
Lemma 1.1 tells us that in cases when no minorities beneﬁt from a (stronger) aﬃrma-
tive action μ˜, then all majorities also prefer the previous matching outcome without μ˜.
With Lemma 1.1, I am now ready to show my ﬁrst main result.
Theorem 1.1: Given a priority structure (, (q, rm)) and its corresponding ((o,r), (q, rm)),
a stable matching mechanism respects the spirit of a stronger minority reserve r˜m, if and
only if ((o,r), (q, r˜m)) is type-speciﬁc acyclic.
18 If there is a school left with empty seats, the chain of rejections will be terminated (without rejecting
another student) once some students rejected by other schools apply to this school.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2. 
Theorem 1.1 clearly reveals that ineﬀective aﬃrmative action policies are due to the
presence of type-speciﬁc cycles. I use Example 1.1 to outline the proof. For the “only
if” part, since both of the two schools only have one available seat while they both
prefer the majority student s1 to the other two minority students s2 and s3 before the
(stronger) minority reserve policy r˜mc1 = 1, the outcome that assigns s1 to c1 and s2 to
c2 is Pareto eﬃcient. If implementing r˜
m
c1
= 1, I have c1 ≡ cr1 and the two minorities
become more preferred to s1, i.e., s2 rc1 s3 rc1 s1. c2 is unaﬀected and with the priority
order s1 oc2 s2 oc2 s3. The rejection of s1 from cr1 initiates a chain reaction which causes
s2 to be rejected by c
o
2 and s3’s rejection from c
r
1. We can easily see the presence of a
type-speciﬁc cycle with two schools and three students, s2 rc1 s3 rc1 s1 oc2 s2, while
Condition (S) is trivially satisﬁed because qc1 = qc2 = 1. The proof of the “if” part
essentially generalizes the case of Example 1.1 by assuming that if a stable mechanism
(e.g., SOSM-R) does not respect the spirit of minority reserve, we can always construct
at least one type-speciﬁc cycle for a given priority structure.
Since some of the minorities may still be strictly worse oﬀ even if a priority structure
contains no type-speciﬁc cycles, I am curious about when a matching mechanism can
ensure that no minority is harmed by a stronger aﬃrmative action.
Deﬁnition 1.4: Given a priority structure (, (q, rm)) and its corresponding ((o,r), (q, rm)),
a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle is constituted of two distinct schools c, c′ and three distinct stu-
dents si, sj, sk where si ∈ S, sk ∈ Sm, and sj ∈ SM , if the following two conditions are
satisﬁed
(C’) Cycle condition: si rc sj oc′ sk.
(S’) Scarcity condition: There exist two disjoint sets of students Sc, Sc′\{si, sj, sk},
such that |Sc| = qc − 1, |Sc′ | = qc′ − 1, Sc ⊂ U rc (sj) ∪ U oc (sj), Sc′ ⊂ U rc′(sk) ∪ U oc′(sk).
Uxc (s) = {s′ ∈ S|s′ xc s}, x = o, r.
((o,r), (q, rm)) is strongly type-speciﬁc acyclic if it has no quasi type-speciﬁc cycles.
The construction of a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle is analogous to the type-speciﬁc cycle.
However, compare to its counterpart in Deﬁnition 1.3, Condition (C’) permits the presence
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of a much weaker cycle for a given priority structure. This makes the strongly type-speciﬁc
acyclicity even more diﬃcult to satisfy.
Remark 1.2: If (, (q, rm)) has a type-speciﬁc cycle, then it has a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle.
Lemma 1.2: For a market Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)) and its corresponding Γm = (Cm, P ′, (o
,r), (q, rm)), let μ and μ˜ be the matching outcomes of SOSM-R before and after a
stronger aﬃrmative action policy r˜m. If there is at least one s ∈ Sm who is strictly worse
oﬀ in μ˜ than in μ, then there must have at least one majority student who is strictly worse
oﬀ in μ˜ than in μ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.3. 
Compared with Lemma 1.1, Lemma 1.2 allows situations where some minorities may
beneﬁt from a stronger aﬃrmative action policy.
Theorem 1.2: Given a priority structure (, (q, rm)) and its corresponding ((o,r), (q, rm)),
a stable matching mechanism respects the improvement of a stronger minority reserve r˜m,
if and only if ((o,r), (q, r˜m)) is strongly type-speciﬁc acyclic.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.4. 
Because for a given priority structure, strongly type-speciﬁc acyclicity is more conﬁned
than the type-speciﬁc acyclicity condition, Theorem 1.2 veriﬁes my intuition that it is
even more diﬃcult to make no minority students worse oﬀ after a (stronger) aﬃrmative
action. Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 clearly demonstrate that the perverse consequence
of aﬃrmative actions on the purported beneﬁciaries does not happen occasionally, instead
it is a fundamental phenomenon concealed in schools’ priority orders.
The following result gives a quite negative response to my second question—when we
can eﬀectively implement aﬃrmative action policies without unsatisfactory outcomes.
Theorem 1.3: Given a priority structure (, (q, rm)) and its corresponding ((o,r), (q, rm)),
suppose that |Sm| ≥ 2, |SM | ≥ 1, and for any two schools c, c′ ∈ C, qc + qc′ ≤ |Sm|. Let
sj be a majority student.
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(i)((o,r), (q, rm)) is type-speciﬁc acyclic, only if there is no more than one minority
student has lower priority than sj in two diﬀerent schools.
(ii) ((o,r), (q, rm)) is strongly type-speciﬁc acyclic, only if no minority students has
lower priority than sj in all schools.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.5. 
In practice, it is almost impossible to ﬁnd markets where almost all schools rank almost
all minorities higher than each majority, let alone where each minority is ranked higher
than each majority in all schools. Theorem 1.3 shows how restrictive the two type-speciﬁc
acyclicity conditions are, and the diﬃculty to eﬀectively incorporate diversity goals into
school choice problems.
1.3.1 Relations with Other Acyclic Conditions
Ergin (2002) characterizes the eﬃcient SOSM (with no diversity concerns) by the following
condition.
Deﬁnition 1.5: (Ergin, 2002) Given a priority structure (, q), a Ergin-cycle is constituted
of two distinct schools c, c′ ∈ C and three distinct students si, sj, sk ∈ S, if the following
two conditions are satisﬁed
(i) sk c si c sj c′ sk.
(ii) There exist two disjoint sets of students Sc, Sc′\{si, sj, sk}, such that |Sc| = qc− 1,
|Sc′ | = qc′ − 1, Sc ⊂ Uc(si), Sc′ ⊂ Uc′(sk). Uc(s) = {s′ ∈ S|s′ c s}.
(, q) is Ergin-acyclic if it has no Ergin-cycles.
My type-speciﬁc acyclicity generalizes Ergin’s characterization into markets with dif-
ferent student types. Because I only require no cycles across types but do not restrict
cycles with students from the same type,19 priority structures that are type-speciﬁc acyclic
may still contain Ergin-cycles.
Remark 1.3: If ((o,r), (q, rm)) has a type-speciﬁc cycle, then it has a Ergin-cycle.
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Ergin-acyclic
type-speciﬁc acyclic
strongly type-speciﬁc acyclic
Fig. 1.1: Venn diagram of the three acyclic conditions
Various acyclicity conditions have been developed in other popular matching mecha-
nisms since Ergin’s seminal work.20 If considering a priority structure as a directed graph
(where each student represents a vertex and the ranking of two adjacent students in each
school’s priority as an edge), we can see that diﬀerent cycle conditions essentially depict
the paths (i.e., a sequence of edges) and cycles (if a path has the same initial and terminal
vertex) inherited in schools’ diverse priority orders. Therefore, an unsophisticated imple-
mentation of aﬃrmative actions will result in arbitrary changes of some schools’ priority
orders which may disentangle some existent paths,21 but it may also create new paths
with subsequent welfare losses to all students involved in the paths. With the almost
19 The reason is obvious, since my purpose is to investigate whether aﬃrmative action policies will
cause welfare loss on the type of minority students. If a cycle only involves students from the same type,
implementing a (stronger) aﬃrmative action will not change the matching outcome.
20 Kesten (2006) shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mechanism
are equivalent if and only if the priority is Kesten-acyclic. Haeringer and Klijn (2009) further indicate
that Ergin-acyclicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Nash implementation of the stable corre-
spondence. Kumano (2013) shows that Boston mechanism is stable and strategy-proof at the same time
if and only if the priority is Kumano-acyclic.
21 For instance, Example 1 of Kojima (2012) illustrates a situation where a stronger majority quota
policy beneﬁts all students, including the majority students, in SOSM.
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inevitable presence of paths in most real-life priority structures, a simple amendment of
extant mechanisms may not be able to achieve desirable diversity goals in school choice.
1.4 Approximately Eﬀective Aﬃrmative Action in Large Market
Comparing approximate performances among diﬀerent algorithms has a long tradition
in computer science, which also draws interests from economists, especially in the ﬁled
of market design, in recent years.22 Using SOSM-R as an example, Theorem 1.3 shows
a quite disappointing result for eﬀective implementations of aﬃrmative action in ﬁnite
market setting. I am curious about whether we can achieve a certain level of approximate
eﬀectiveness when the number of players are suﬃciently large.23
Recall Claim 1.1, I know that after splitting each school c with quota qc and minority
reserve rmc into two corresponding sub-schools, the original sub-school (c
o) and the reserve
sub-school (cr), running SOSM in the auxiliary market Γm generates the same matching
outcome as the SOSM-R in the original market Γ. I ﬁrst introduce a sequential version
of the SOSM-R, denoted by Sequential SOSM-R, which still generates the same outcomes
as the SOSM-R in market Γ. However, as minority students and majority students are
added separately into the Sequential SOSM-R, this auxiliary procedure helps us clearly
disentangle the possible rejection chains initiated from the two types of students.
I provide a brief description of the Sequential SOSM-R here, and defer the formal
deﬁnition in Appendix 1.7.
• Loop 1: Run the SOSM for a sub-market composed of all schools, minority students and
possibly matched majorities from Loop 2 (if any). Each minority retains her relative
ranking of all schools as in the original SOSM-R, and ﬁrst applies to the reserve sub-
school (cr) of her most favorable school c. Each cr school accepts as many as applicants
22 Loosely, the idea is to show that for some desirable properties that are unattainable (or incompatible)
in ﬁnite market (i.e., with a small amount of schools and students in the context of school choice), it is
able to retrieve their approximate counterparts in large markets (where the number of market participants
goes to inﬁnity).
23 Note that although (countably) inﬁnite largely serves as a theoretical upper bound for the sake of
computing convergent rate (or proving the existence of approximate equilibria), many real world matching
markets do have a large number of applicants and institutions. For instance, in the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP), the number of hospital programs is between 3,000 and 4,000 and the number
of students is over 20,000 each year. In the New York public school choice program, there are about 500
schools and over 90,000 students per year.
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to ﬁll up its empty seats. If there is still some minority applicants on the waiting list, cr
ﬁrst rejects an equivalent number of majorities matched from Loop 2 (if any), accepts
the rest applicants with the highest priorities until its capacity is ﬁlled or the applicants
are exhausted. All rejected minorities then applies to the corresponding original sub-
school co of c. Each co accepts up to qc − rmc applicants with the highest priorities and
rejects the rest. If the minority gets rejected again, she applies to her next highest
choice of school c (if any) accordingly. Keep all rejected majorities from either cr or co
unmatched until Loop 1 terminates and add to the applicants in Loop 2. Loop 1 stops
until no rejection occurs and tentative matching at that step is ﬁnalized.
• Loop 2: One by one, run the SOSM for a sub-market of all unmatched applicants
from Loop 1, all original sub-schools (co) and only schools still have empty seats (or
matched with some majorities) in the set of reserve sub-schools (cr) from Loop 1. First
place each unmatched majority to co of her most favorable school c. Each co accepts
up to qc − rmc applicants with the highest priorities from either types. All rejected
majorities apply to the corresponding reserve sub-school cr of c. Each cr school (with
empty seats or matched with some majorities from Loop 1) accepts the set of majorities
with the highest priorities until its empty seats is ﬁlled up, replaces some less preferred
majorities matched in Loop 1, and rejects the rest.24 If the majority gets rejected again,
she applies to her next highest choice of school c (if any) accordingly. Keep all rejected
minorities from any co unmatched until Loop 2 terminates, and add back to Loop 1.
Loop 2 stops until no rejection occurs and tentative matching at that step is ﬁnalized.
The Sequential SOSM-R algorithm terminates either when every student is matched
to a school or every unmatched student has been rejected by every acceptable school. It
terminates in a ﬁnite number of steps, and will produce the same matches as the original
SOSM-R. Denote its outcome, under market Γm by fSE(Γm).
Before going further, I ﬁrst use Example 1.1 to illustrate how the Sequential SOSM-R
works with the (stronger) minority reserve q˜c1 = (qc1 , r˜
m
c1
) = (1, 1). In the Sequential
SOSM-R, I ﬁrst split the two schools c1 and c2 into their corresponding (c
o
1, c
r
1) and
24 i.e. a majority student will be accepted in any cr only if there is an empty seat or she is more
preferred than a tentatively matched majority; no minorities are allowed to be rejected from cr in Loop
2.
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(co2, c
r
2). (i) Initiate Loop 1, the minority student s2 ﬁrst applies to c
r
2 while s3 to c
r
1,
given qc1 = |cr1| = 1 (with |co1| = 0) and qc2 = |co2| = 1 (with |cr2| = 0). s2 and s3 are
tentatively accepted by co2 and c
r
1 respectively. Loop 1 stops. (ii) Initiate Loop 2, the
majority students s1 applies to c
r
1 directly (as c
o
1 has no capacity given qc1 = |cr1| = 1), and
is rejected given s3 rc1 s1. Next, s1 applies to co2. As s1 oc2 s2, the minority student s2
previously matched with co2 from Loop 1 get rejected, and is kept unmatched until Loop 2
stops. (iii) Initiate Loop 1 again, s2 now applies to c
r
1. Given s2 rc1 s3 while s2, s3 ∈ Sm,
s3 gets rejected. s3 then applies to c
o
2 and gets rejected again. The Sequential SOSM-R
terminates. Clearly, fR(Γ) = fSE(Γm).
In order to analyze the convergence process in large matching markets, I need to
consider a sequence of markets of diﬀerent sizes. I ﬁrst extend my notation of the market
tuple Γ to incorporate the uncertainty when adding additional students and schools into
the market. A random market is a tuple Γ = ((Sm, S), C, P,, (q, rm), k,P), where Sm
is the subset of minority students from the set of students S, k is a positive integer and
P = (pc)c∈C is a probability distribution on C, with pc > 0 for each c ∈ C. For simplicity,
I assume that minorities and majorities have similar favors for schools, i.e., all students
generate their preferences from the same probability distribution of schools.25
Each random market induces a market by randomly generated preferences of each
student s as follows (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005):26
• Step 1: Select a school independently from the distribution P . List this school as the
top ranked school of student s.
...
• Step t ≤ k: Select a school independently from P which has not been drawn from steps
1 to step t− 1. List this school as the tth most preferred school of student s.
Student s only lists these k schools as her preference order. For each realization
of student preferences, a market with perfect information is obtained.27 A sequence of
25 My main result (Theorem 1.4) will not change even if schools are drawn by students with diﬀerent
patterns. However, the result may give a diﬀerent convergence rate.
26 Terminologies used in this section can also be found in Kojima and Pathak (2009), Kojima et al.
(2013). Also, see Knuth et al. (1990) for an earlier intellectual contribution.
27 One important assumption is that student preferences are drawn independently from one another,
and the way in which each student’s preference order is drawn also follows a particular procedure. Again,
for simplicity, I only consider the above procedure with distribution P to generate preferences.
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random markets is denoted by (Γˆ1, Tˆ 2, . . . ), where Γˆn = ((Sm,n, Sn), Cn, (qn, rm,n),Cn
, kn,Pn) is a random market in which |Cn| is the number of schools, and |rm,n| is the
number of seats reserved for minorities.28
Deﬁnition 1.6: A sequence of random markets (Γˆ1, Γˆ2, . . . ) is regular, if these exist λ > 0,
a ∈ [0, 1
2
), b > 0, r ≥ 1, and positive integers k and q¯, such that for all n,
1. kn = k,
2. qc ≤ q¯ for all c ∈ Cn,
3. |Sm,n| ≤ λn, |rm| ≤ bna
4. pc
pc′
∈ [1
r
, r] for all c, c′ ∈ Cn,
5. every s ∈ Sn is acceptable to c at any realization of preferences for c at Pn.
Condition (1) assumes that the length of students’ preferences does not increase with
the market size. Condition (2) requires that the capacity of each school is bounded across
schools and markets. Condition (3) requires that the number of minority students does
not grow much faster than the number of schools. Moreover, the number of seats reserved
for minority students grows at a slower rate of O(na) where a ∈ [0, 1
2
).29 Condition (4)
requires that the popularity of diﬀerent schools (as measured by the probability of being
selected by students as acceptable) does not vary too much. Condition (5) requires schools
to ﬁnd any student acceptable, but priority orders are otherwise arbitrary.
Given all these preparations, the following result gives my main argument under the
large market setting, which states that the SOSM-R is very likely to respect the spirit of
a stronger minority reserve when the number of schools is suﬃciently large.
Theorem 1.4: Consider a regular sequence of random markets. There exists n0 such that
the SOSM-R approximately respects the spirit of a stronger minority reserve r˜m for any
market in that sequence with more than n0 schools.
28 In this section, superscripts are used for the types of each single school c after the splitting process in
Γm, the number of schools present in the sequence of random markets, and the types of students. These
notations will be relabeled in Appendix 1.7.
29 Also, I assume that the number of majority students grows at a same rate as minorities, but such
assumption is irrelevant for my main result.
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I give the intuition of my proof here and leave its details to Appendix 1.4. First, notice
that when there is a large number of schools presenting in the market, after Loop 1, many
of them either are not listed by any minorities, or even if some minorities have already
applied to these schools but they are not required to implement minority reserves. Next,
consider at each instance in Loop 2 when majorities are added to the Sequential SOSM-
R, according to Lemma 1.3, it is very unlikely for the current applicants (i.e., majority
students) submit to a school which has been applied by any minorities (and implemented
with minority reserve at the same time) in Loop 1. Therefore, I show that when the
market becomes suﬃciently large while the number of seats reserved for minorities are
not growing too fast, it is unlikely to have minorities rejected by some majorities in Loop
2. As the type-speciﬁc cycle essentially characterizes a chain of rejections and acceptances,
when the market is suﬃciently large, a rejection chain which returns a current matched
minority student to the initial school c0 and makes each minority student involved in this
chain strictly worse oﬀ becomes unlikely to happen.30
However, even though a priority structure is unlikely to contain any type-speciﬁc cycles
when the number of schools is large, as long as some minority students have lower rankings
than any majority students in some random schools, I still cannot safely eliminate the
possible presence of quasi type-speciﬁc cycles.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes two welfare criteria to evaluate the eﬀective implementation of aﬃr-
mative action policies in school choice problems. I characterize two type-speciﬁc acyclicity
conditions in the SOSM-R (Hafalir et al., 2013) and demonstrate their respective (mate-
rial) equivalence with the two welfare criteria in stable matching mechanisms. I further
show that type-speciﬁc cycles will gradually vanish with the increase of the market size.
At the policy level, my results suggest that instead of discriminating majority students
through aﬃrmative actions, i.e., exchanging the welfare gain of some minority students
from impairing other students, an alternative policy practice to rebalance education op-
30 Kojima et al. (2013) use similar arguments to show that in large markets, because a strategic rejection
of a female doctor will not return another more preferred male applicant to this hospital with a high
probability, truth-telling thus becomes an approximate equilibrium from the hospital side under the
doctor-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
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portunities is to increase the supply of high-quality schools.
Last, since in general we can treat the eﬀective implementation of aﬃrmative actions
as a market design problem with diﬀerent types of players and type-speciﬁc capacity
constraints, I believe a thorough analysis of aﬃrmative action also preserves general the-
oretical interests that are not limited in school choice problems.
1.6 Appendix for Chapter 1: Proofs of Finite Market Results
Notations: (the following notations are used throughout the proofs)
Let μ be the matching by SOSM-R in a random market Γ = (C, P,, (q, rm)) and μ˜ be
the matching outcome after a stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m, r˜m > rm. Denote the market
after r˜m by Γ˜ = (C, P,, (q, r˜m)). Γm = (Cm, P ′, (o,r), (q, rm)) and Γ˜m = (Cm, P ′, (o
,r), (q, r˜m)) are the two respective markets of Γ and Γ˜ after splitting each school into
the original sub-school (co) and the reserve sub-school (cr).
1.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
I prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose that if μ˜(s) is Pareto dominated by μ(s)
for all s ∈ Sm, there has at least one majority student s0 ∈ SM who prefers μ˜ to μ in
Γ˜m, μ˜(s0)Ps0μ(s0). Let μ˜(s0) = c1 and μ(s0) = c0. Since s0 is a majority student, she is
rejected by a reserve sub-school. Because s0 prefers c1 to c0, she must have been rejected
by c1 in Γ
m (which leads to the matching μ), at an earlier step before s0 applies to c0.
Denote the step when s0 is rejected by c1 in Γ
m step l of the SOSM algorithm. At that
step, c1 must have exhausted its capacity, |μ(c1)| = qc1 , and s xc1 s0, x = o, r, for all s
tentatively accepted by c1 at step l. Since μ˜(s0) = c1, there must have another student,
denote by s1, such that s1 is tentatively accepted by c1 at step l (in Γ
m) but matches with
another school in Γ˜m. Recall that at step l, s0 is rejected by c1, it implies that s1 rc1 s0.
I ﬁrst show that s1 must be a majority student who has applied to c1 at a step earlier
than l in Γm. Otherwise, if s1 ∈ Sm, because μ˜ is Pareto dominated by μ for all s ∈ Sm,
while μ(s1) = μ˜(s1), it implies that μ(s1)Ps1μ˜(s1). Also, recall that s1 is tentatively
accepted by c1 before her ﬁnal match in Γ
m, c1Rs1μ(s1), I have c1Ps1μ˜(s1). Since the
stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m only increases the capacity of some cr, (s1, c1) forms a
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blocking pair in Γ˜m, which contradicts the stability of μ˜ (with minority reserve). Thus,
s1 ∈ SM . Obviously, s1 applies to c1 at a step earlier than l.
Next, since μ˜(s1) = c1, while s1 rc1 s0 and s0, s1 ∈ SM , it implies that μ˜(s1)Ps1c1. Oth-
erwise, (s1, c1) is a blocking pair in Γ˜
m. Combine with c1Rs1μ(s1), I have μ˜(s1)Ps1μ(s1).
Denote μ˜(s1) = c2. Recall that in Γ
m, s1 applies to c1 before step l. Without loss of
generality, denote this step by l − 1. I can repeat the proceeding arguments for s0 and
s1, and construct a set of l majority students who are all better-oﬀ in Γ˜
m. That is,
μ˜(si)PsiciRsiμ(si), i = {0, . . . , l− 1}, si ∈ SM . ci belongs to a set of l schools in which for
each si she is tentatively accepted at step l − i. In particular, let step 1 be the step that
initiates the matching in market Γm when sl−1 applies to cl−1. Because sl−1 applies to cl−1
at the ﬁrst step, it implies that cl−1Psl−1c, for all c ∈ C\cl−1. Recall that cl−1 = μ˜(sl−1),
which contradicts to μ˜(sl−1)Psl−1cl−1. 
1.6.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
(i) Type-speciﬁc acyclicity =⇒ Respect the spirit of reserve-based aﬃrmative action. I
prove the contrapositive, such that if μ(s)Rsμ˜(s) for all s ∈ Sm, and μ(s)Psμ˜(s) for at
least one s ∈ Sm, there must contain a type-speciﬁc cycle with at least two schools and
three students.
Lemma 1.1 indicates that if μ˜(s) is Pareto dominated by μ(s) for all s ∈ Sm, then
there has at least one s′ ∈ SM , μ(s′)Ps′μ˜(s′). Denote S˜ = {s ∈ S|μ(s)Psμ˜(s)} be the set
of students strictly prefer the matching μ. Because μ(s)Rsμ˜(s) for all s ∈ S\S˜, for those
who are not strictly worse oﬀ after implementing r˜m, they are matched with the same
school under μ, i.e., S\S˜ = {s ∈ S|μ(s) = μ˜(s)}.
Choose a set of students from S˜, S˜ ′ ⊆ S˜, such that for all s ∈ S˜ ′, μ˜(s) = s. S˜ ′ is
nonempty. Otherwise, there has at least one minority student s ∈ S˜ and μ˜(s) = s, such
that s and μ(s) forms a blocking pair after the stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m. Further, S˜ ′
contains at least one minority student and one majority student. Because if all s′ ∈ SM∩S˜,
μ˜(s′) = s′, then for some s ∈ Sm ∩ S˜, s and μ(s) forms a blocking pair after r˜m.
Without loss of generality, denote sj ∈ SM ∩ S˜ ′ who is directly aﬀected by r˜m,31
31 A majority student s who is directly aﬀected by a stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m in the sense that if
μ(s) = c and μ˜(s) = c, rmc < r˜mc , then there is a minority student s′ such that μ(s′) = c, cPs′μ(s′), and s′
is tentatively accepted by c at the step when s is rejected. Further, by rmc < r˜
m
c , I know that μ(s) = c
o,
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μ(sj) = c0. Since c0Psj μ˜(sj), and μ˜ is stable (Hafalir et al., 2013), this implies that
|μ˜(c0)| = qc0 , |μ˜(c0)∩Sm| = r˜mc0 , and for all s who are tentatively accepted by cx0 , s xc0 sj,
x = o, r. Since sj is a majority student who is directly aﬀected by the stronger aﬃrmative
action r˜m, there has a minority student tentatively accepted by c0, denote by si, such
that c0Psiμ(si) and sj oc0 si. It implies that si ∈ cr0 in Γ˜m (because of si rc0 sj).
Otherwise, (sj, c0) forms a blocking pair. However, μ˜(si) = c0 by assumption (otherwise
μ˜(si)Psiμ(si)). Since si cannot be rejected by an majority student from c
r
0, there must
have another minority student, denote by sk, such that sk ∈ Sm ∩ S˜ ′, sk ∈ μ˜(c0)\μ(c0)
and sk rc0 si. Thus, I have
sk rc0 si rc0 sj, si, sk ∈ Sm, sj ∈ SM (1.1)
Denote μ(sk) = ck. Because ckPskc0 and μ˜ is stable, it implies that |μ˜(ck)| = qck , and
there exists a student in S˜ ′, denote by sk−1, such that
sk−1 ∈ μ˜(ck)\μ(ck), sk−1 ock sk (1.2)
Otherwise, (sk, ck) forms a blocking pair in Γ˜
m. Apply similar arguments of sk−1, sk
and c0, ck for each student in S˜ ′ repeatedly. Because the set of students in S˜ ′ are ﬁ-
nite, let {s0, s1, . . . , sk−2, sk−1} ∈ S˜ ′\{sk}, I can construct a ﬁnite sequence of schools
c1, c2, . . . , ck−1, ck such that for each l = {0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}
sl ∈ μ˜(cl+1)\μ(cl+1), μ(sl) = cl, clPslcl+1 (1.3)
|μ˜(cl)| = qcl , s xcl sl, x = o, r, for each s ∈ μ˜(cl) (1.4)
In particular, I have
s oc s′, and s is tentatively accepted by cr (before s′ applies to c) after the stronger aﬃrmative action.
The set of majority students that are directly aﬀected by r˜m is nonempty; otherwise, μ(Γm) = μ(Γ˜m).
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⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
sl ocl+1 sl+1 if sl+1 ∈ Sm
sl rcl+1 sl+1 if sl+1 ∈ SM , l = {0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}
(1.5)
It is not diﬃcult to see that s0 ≡ sj by preceding arguments. Combining (1.1) and
(1.5) gives us the cycle condition. The scarcity condition is satisﬁed by (1.2), (1.3) and
(1.4), and the stability of SOSM.
(ii) Respect the spirit of reserve-based aﬃrmative action =⇒ Type-speciﬁc acyclicity.
Suppose that Γ˜m has a type-speciﬁc cycle, I use a counter-example to show that the
stronger minority reserve policy r˜m will cause all minorities worse oﬀ.
Recall Example 1.1 that after implementing r˜mc1 = 1, the three students s1 ∈ SM and
s2, s3 ∈ Sm, and the two schools {c1, c2}, constitute a type-speciﬁc cycle: Condition (C)
is given by s2 rc1 s3 rc1 s1 oc2 s2, Condition (S) is trivially satisﬁed because qcl = 1,
l = 1, 2. The matching outcome after the stronger aﬃrmative action r˜mc1 is μ(s1) = c2
and μ(s2) = c1. Compared with the corresponding matching before r˜
m: μ(s1) = c1 and
μ(s2) = c2, it is obviously that s2 is strictly worse oﬀ after r˜
m
c1
while s3 is indiﬀerent. 
1.6.3 Proof of Lemma 1.2
I prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose at least one of the minority students is
strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜m compare to Γm, but no majority students are strictly worse oﬀ
after implementing r˜m. Let S˜m be the set of minority students who are strictly worse oﬀ
after r˜m, μ(s)Psμ˜(s), for all s ∈ S˜m ⊂ Sm. And for all s′ ∈ Sm\S˜m, either μ˜(s′)Rs′μ(s′)
or μ˜(s′)Ps′μ(s′).
Suppose that a minority student, denote by s0, is strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m compare to
Γm. Let μ(s0) = c1. Since c1Ps0μ˜(s0), the capacity of c1 is full at the step when s0 is
rejected by c1 in Γ˜
m, there is another student, say s1, such that s1 is tentatively accepted
by c1 when s0 is rejected. Denote the step when s1 applies to c1 (or equivalently, s0 is
rejected by c1) in Γ˜
m be step l of the SOSM algorithm.
I ﬁrst show that if s1 is a majority student, then there have a group of minority
students, denote by S˜m1 , who are strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m compare to Γm, i.e., S˜m1 ∈ S˜m,
and apply to c1 at a step earlier than l in Γ˜
m. Since s1 ∈ SM , and no majority students
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are strictly worse oﬀ after implementing r˜m by assumption, I know that either c1Ps1μ(s1)
or c1Rs1μ(s1). Recall that c1Ps0μ˜(s0), s0 ∈ Sm, and all minorities have higher priorities
than any majorities in all reserve sub-schools cr, I know that s1 oc1 s0, s0 ∈ μ(cr1)
but s0 ∈ μ˜(co1). Otherwise (s0, c1) would form a blocking pair in Γ˜m. Therefore, there
must have a group of minority students, denote by S˜m1 , who apply to and are tentatively
accepted by c1 at a step earlier than l (when c1 rejects s0) in Γ˜
m, but do not apply to c1 in
Γm. s oc1 s0 for all s ∈ S˜m1 ,32 but μ(s)Psc1 for all s ∈ S˜m1 . Otherwise, (s, c1) are blocking
pairs in Γm for all s ∈ S˜m1 . Without losing of generality, denote the least preferred student
in S˜m1 be s2 (if |S˜m1 | = 1, then S˜m1 ≡ s2), such that s oc1 s2 oc1 s0 for all s ∈ S˜m1 \s2.
If s1 is a minority student, I know that s1 must be strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m compare
to Γm, μ(s1)Ps1c1. Otherwise, (s1, c1) forms a blocking pair in Γ
m. Thus, s1 ∈ S˜m, and
s1 is rejected by μ(s1) at a step earlier than l by another student, denote by s˙. Since s0
is a random minority student who is strictly worse oﬀ after r˜m, I can equivalently treat
s1 as s0 when s1 ∈ Sm. Therefore, (i) if s˙ ∈ Sm, repeat the same arguments in this
paragraph, I know that s˙ ∈ S˜m, rewrite s˙ as s2; (ii) if s˙ ∈ SM , apply the arguments in the
previous paragraph (i.e., equivalently treat s˙ as s1 when s1 ∈ SM), and I have another
set of minority students, denote by S˜m2 , who are strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m compare to Γm,
write the least preferred minority student in S˜m2 as s2.
Hence, if there is one minority student, s0, who is strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m compare to
Γm, there must have another minority student, s2, who is also strictly worse oﬀ in Γ˜
m and
is rejected by μ(s2) at a step earlier than l in Γ˜
m. Repeat the preceding arguments I can
construct a set of l minority students, denote by S˜l, such that ci+1Psici, i = {1, . . . , l},
si ∈ S˜l ⊂ S˜m, where ci+1 = μ(si), and ci belongs to a set of l schools in which si is
tentatively accepted by ci at step l − i + 1 of the SOSM algorithm in Γ˜m. In particular,
sl ∈ S˜l applies to and is tentatively accepted by cl at step 1. It implies that clPslc, for all
c ∈ C\cl, recall μ(sl) = cl, which contradicts to μ(sl)Pslcl. 
32 i.e., all minority students belong to S˜m1 have higher priorities in c1 than s0 in both the reserve sub-
school and the original sub-school (co1). Recall that the point-wise priorities among the minorities do not
change in both kinds of sub-schools.
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1.6.4 Proof of Theorem 1.2
(i) Strongly type-speciﬁc acyclicity =⇒ Respect the improvement of reserve-based aﬃrma-
tive action. Suppose if μ(s)Psμ˜(s) for at least one s ∈ Sm, I show that Γ˜m must have a
quasi type-speciﬁc cycle with two schools and three students.
Lemma 1.2 implies that if μ(s)Psμ˜(s) for at least one s ∈ Sm, then μ(s′)Ps′μ˜(s′) for
at least one s′ ∈ SM . Denote s0 be a minority student who is strictly worse oﬀ after
the stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m. Let μ(s0) = c0, and step k be the step of the SOSM
algorithm when s0 is rejected by c0 in Γ˜
m. Without loss of generality, I can construct a
set of k − 1 students, sl = {s1, s2, . . . , sk−1} ∈ S, such that μ(sl)Pslμ˜(sl) = sl, μ(sl) = cl,
l = {1, . . . , k − 1}, k ≥ 2. Let k − l be the step when sl is rejected by μ(sl) in Γ˜m. sl
applies to cl−1 at step k − l + 1. In particular, I have s1 is rejected by μ(s1) = c1 at step
k − 1 and applies to c0 at step k. Thus,
(i.a.) if all students in sl except sk−1 are minorities. By my construction of sl, sk−1
is rejected by μ(sk−1) = ck−1 at step 1 of the SOSM algorithm in Γ˜m, and applies to
ck−2 in the next step. Obviously, sk−1 is directly aﬀected by r˜m (recall Footnote 31), and
sk−1 ∈ SM . Thus, there must have another minority student, denote by s˙, s˙ ∈ Sm\sl,
who prefers ck−1 to all the rest schools but is rejected by ck−1 in Γm (i.e., before the
stronger aﬃrmative action r˜m). That is, ck−1Ps˙ c, for all c ∈ C\ck−1, sk−1 ock−1 s˙ but
s˙ rck−1 sk−1. Otherwise, (sk−1, ck−1) forms a blocking pair in Γ˜m. In addition, I know
that sk−2 is rejected by μ(sk−2) = ck−2 at step 2, when sk−1 applies to ck−2. As sk−1 ∈ SM
and sk−2 ∈ Sm, I have sk−1 ock−2 sk−2. Thus, s˙ rck−1 sk−1 ock−2 sk−2.
(i.b.) if s1 ∈ Sm, and there is at least one student in sl besides sk−1 is a majority
student. Let sl be a minority student in sl\{s1}, who is rejected from μ(sl) = cl in Γ˜m when
a majority student in sl applies to cl. Denote this majority student sl−1 and μ(sl−1) = cl−1.
Thus, sl−1 ocl sl (a minority student can be rejected by a majority student only from an
original sub-school). By my construction of sl, there is another student sl−2 ∈ sl, who is
tentatively accepted by cl−1 at the step when sl−1 is rejected by cl−1. Thus, sl−2 rcl−1 sl−1
(a majority student can be rejected by another student only from a reserve sub-school).
With sl−2 ∈ S, sl−1 ∈ SM , and sl ∈ Sm, I have sl−2 rcl−1 sl−1 ocl sl.
(i.c.) if s1 ∈ SM . Since s0 ∈ sm, c0 rejects s0 at step k of the SOSM algorithm when
s1 applies to c0, I have s1 oc0 s0. Similar to the previous cases, by my construction of sl,
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s1 is rejected by μ(s1) = c1 at step k− 1 when s2 ∈ sl applies and is tentatively accepted
by c1. Thus, s2 rc1 s1, and I have s2 rc1 s1 oc0 s0, with s2 ∈ S, s1 ∈ SM and s0 ∈ Sm.
Condition (S’) is trivially satisﬁed through the preceding arguments and the stability
of SOSM in all three cases.
(ii) Respect the improvement of reserve-based aﬃrmative action =⇒ Strongly type-
speciﬁc acyclicity. Suppose that Γ˜m has a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle, I argue that there is
at least one minority student strictly worse oﬀ after implementing the stronger minority
reserve policy r˜m. Remark 1.2 implies that if (, (q, rm)) has a type-speciﬁc cycle, then it
has a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle. Example 1.1 used in the Proof of Theorem 1.1 (Appendix
1.6.4), which constructs a type-speciﬁc cycle and leaves s2 strictly worse oﬀ after r˜
m,
suﬃces for my purpose. 
1.6.5 Proof of Theorem 1.3
For a given Γ, let |Sm| = m and sj be a random majority student. Choose two schools
c, c′ ∈ C and relabel the minority students with the lowest priority and second lowest pri-
ority in c as im−1 and im, and in c′ as km−1 and km respectively. I prove the contrapositive
for both of the two parts.
Part (i) Suppose that sj ranks higher than two diﬀerent minority students in c
o and
c′o, I will show that Γ contains a type-speciﬁc cycle.
Case (i.a.) im = km. Because s rc im, for all s ∈ Sm\im, I have km rc im, and
there are other m−2 minority students who have higher priority than km in c (recall that
the priority order are unchanged among the minorities within cr and co). As I assume
qc + qc′ ≤ m, it implies that qc − 1 ≤ m − 2. Thus, I can ﬁnd a set of qc − 1 minority
students who have higher priority than im in c from S
m\{im, km}, denote by Sc. For
school c′, because m− 2− (qc − 1) ≥ m− 2− (m− qc′ − 1) = qc′ − 1, I can ﬁnd a set of
minority students that are distinct from im, km and Sc who are ranked higher than km in
c′, denote by Sc′ . Condition (C) is satisﬁed by km rc im rc sj oc km, Sc and Sc′ suﬃces
Condition (S).
Case (i.b.) im = km. Without loss of generality, suppose that sj oc′ km−1. Since
there are m− 2 minority students who have higher priority than km−1 in c′, with similar
argument in Case (i.a.), I can ﬁnd a set of qc′ − 1 minority students that are distinct
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from km, km−1, denote by Sc′ , and a set of qc − 1 minority students that are distinct from
km, km−1 and Sc′ , denote by Sc. Condition (C) is satisﬁed by km−1 rc im rc sj oc′ km−1,
Sc and Sc′ suﬃces Condition (S).
Part (ii) I have already shown in Part (i) that when sj ranks higher than two diﬀerent
minority students in two schools, there is a type-speciﬁc cycle. Recall Remark 1.2, if
(, (q, rm)) has a type-speciﬁc cycle, then it has a quasi type-speciﬁc cycle. Thus, I
only need to discuss the situation when there is only one minority student ranked lower
than sj in one (original sub-)school. Without loss of generality, suppose that sj oc′ km.
Case (ii.a.) im = km, since im rc sj, im, sj and km suﬃce Condition (C’). Case (ii.b.)
im = km, Condition (C’) is given by im−1 rc sj oc′ km. Condition (S’) is satisﬁed in both
of the two cases with the same arguments in (i.a.). 
1.7 Appendix for Chapter 1: Proofs of Large Market Results
The proof involves a few steps. In brief, I ﬁrst show that there is a large number of
schools that are not listed on any minorities’ preference orders at the end of Loop 1 of the
Sequential SOSM-R. Then, under the regularity conditions (Deﬁnition 1.6), I show that
the probability that no majority students apply to such schools converges to one when
the number of schools are suﬃciently large.
Deﬁne the Stochastic Sequential SOSM-R (Algorithm 1.)
Notations Use As (and Ds) to record schools that s(m) (and s(M)) has already drawn
from Pn (respectively). When |As| = k is reached, As is the set of schools acceptable to s.
Also, Bi (and Ej) to represent the set of rejected minorities (and majorities) from Loop
2 (and Loop 1, respectively).
1. Initialization: Let l(m) = 1 and l(M) = 1. For every s(m) ∈ S(m) (s(M) ∈ S(M),
respectively), let As = ∅ (Ds = ∅, respectively). Order all majorities and minorities
in their respective arbitrarily ﬁxed manner. Set B0 = ∅, E0 = ∅, i = 0.
2. Loop 1:
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(a) If Bi = ∅, then go to Step (2b). Otherwise, pick some minority s(m) in Bi, let
Bi+1 = Bi\s(m), increment i by one and go to Step (2c).
(b) Choose the applicant:
i. If l(m) ≤ |S(m)|, then let s(m) be the l(m)th student and increment l(m)
by one.
ii. If not, then go to Step (3).
(c) Choosing the applied:
i. If |As| ≥ k, then return to Step (2a).
(ii.) If not, select c randomly from distribution Pn until c /∈ As, and add c to
As. Split each c listed by any students into two corresponding sub-schools,
original sub-school (c(o)) and reserve sub-school (c(m)), according to the
process deﬁned in Section 1.2.2, and adapt the preferences of schools and
students correspondingly.
(d) Acceptance and/or rejection:
i. Each s(m) ﬁrst applies to the reserve sub-school (c(m)) of her most favor-
able school c. If c(m) prefers each of its current mates to s(m) and there is
no empty seat, c(m) rejects s(m). s(m) then applies to the corresponding
original sub-school c(o) of c. If c(o) prefers each of its current mates to
s(m) and there is no empty seat, c(o) rejects s(m). Go back to Step (2c).
(ii.) If c(m) has no empty seat but it prefers s(m) to one of its current mates,
then c(m) rejects the least preferred student tentatively accepted. If the
rejected student is a majority, add her to Ej, and go to Step (2a). If the
rejected student is a minority, let this student be s(m). Let her applies to
the corresponding original sub-school c(o) of c.
A. If c(o) prefers each of its current mates to s(m) and there is no empty
seat, then c(o) rejects s(m), and go back to Step (2c).
B. If c(o) prefers s(m) to one of her current mates, s(m) is accepted. If
the rejected student is a majority, add her to Ej, and go to Step (2a).
If the rejected student is a minority, let this student be s(m), and go
back to Step (2c).
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(iii.) If c(m) prefers each of its current mates to s(m) and there is no empty
seat, then c(m) rejects s(m). If the corresponding c(o) of c also has no
empty seat but it prefers s(m) to one of its current mates, then c(o) rejects
the least preferred student tentatively accepted. If the rejected student is
a majority, add her to Ej, and go to Step (2a). If the rejected student is
a minority, let this student be s(m) and go back to Step (2c).
(iv.) If either c(m) or its corresponding c(o) has an empty seat, then s(m) is
tentatively accepted. Go back to Step (2a).
3. Loop 2:
(a) If Ej = ∅ but Bi = ∅. Go to Step (2)
(b) If Ej and Bi are both empty. Go to Step (3d).
(c) Otherwise, pick some minority s(M) in Ej, let Ej+1 = Ej\s(M), increment j
by one and go to Step (3e).
(d) Choose the applicant:
i. If l(M) ≤ |S(M)|, then let s(M) be the l(M)th student and increment
l(M) by one.
ii. If not, then terminate the algorithm.
(e) Choosing the applied:
i. If |Ds| ≥ k, then return to Step (3).
ii. If not, select c randomly from distribution Pn until c /∈ Ds, and add c to
Ds. Split each c listed by any students into two corresponding sub-schools,
the minority-favoring reserve (c(m)) and the original (c(o)), according to
the process deﬁned in Section 1.2.2, and adapt the preferences of schools
and students correspondingly.
(f) Acceptance and/or rejection (“Round j”):
i. Each s(M) ﬁrst applies to the original school (c(o)) of her most favorable
school c. If c(o) prefers each of its current mates to s(M) and there is
no empty seat, c(o) rejects s(M). s(M) then applies to the corresponding
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reserve sub-school c(m) of c. If c(m) prefers each of its current mates to
S(M) and there is no empty seat, then c(m) rejects s(M). Go back to
Step (3e).
ii. If c(o) has no empty seat but it prefers s(M) to one of its current mates,
then c(o) rejects the least preferred student tentatively accepted. If the
rejected student is a minority, add her to Bi and go to Step (3c). If the
rejected student is a majority, let this student be s(M). Let her applies to
the corresponding reserve sub-school c(m) of c.
A. If c(m) prefers each of its current mates to S(M) and there is no empty
seat, then c(m) rejects s(M). Go back to Step (3e).
B. If c(m) prefers s(M) to one of its current matched majority, s(M) is
accepted, and let the rejected majority student be s(M), go to Step
(3e).
iii. If c(o) prefers each of its current mates to s(M) and there is no empty seat,
then c(o) rejects s(M). If the corresponding c(m) of c also has no empty
seat but it prefers s(m) to one of current matched majority, then c(m)
rejects the least preferred majority tentatively accepted. Let the rejected
majority student be s(M), go to Step (3e).
iv. If either c(o) or its corresponding c(m) has an empty seat, then s(M) is
tentatively accepted. Go back to Step (3c).
Step 2: The market is type-speciﬁc acyclic with a high probability
Denote Vn be a random set of schools that are either not listed in any minorities’
preference orders at the end of Loop 1 of the Sequential SOSM-R, or listed by some
minority students but are not required to implement aﬃrmative actions. Let Xn = |Vn|
be a random variable counts the number of schools in Vn.
33 I ﬁrst state the following
result which provides a lower bound of Xn at the beginning of Loop 2. Since it is almost
identical to Lemma 2 of Kojima et al. (2013), the proof is omitted.
33 I denote a random variable and its realization by the same letter, if no confusion arises.
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Lemma 1.3: For any n > 4k
E[Xn] ≥ n
2
e−16λk
Kojima et al. (2013) write their result based on the set of schools not listed by any
minority students, denote by Yn, and prove that E[|Yn|] ≥ n2 e−16λk (i.e. a large set of
schools not listed by any minority students). Since I denote Xn to include all schools in
Yn and an additional set of schools that even have been listed by some minorities but
without seats reserved for minorities (i.e. the capacity of its sub-school c(m) is zero).
Clearly, E[Xn] ≥ E[|Yn|].
Let Pr (Γˆn,tsc) be the probability that the corresponding priority structure in a random
market Γˆn is type-speciﬁc acyclic. Also, let R¯ = bna be the upper bound on the number
of seats reserved for minority students in the random market Γˆn. The following lemma
states that when market is suﬃciently large (and conditional on Xn >
E[Xn]
2
), it becomes
type-speciﬁc acyclic with a high probability.
Lemma 1.4: For any suﬃciently large n,
Pr
(
Γˆn,tsc
∣∣∣ Xn > E[Xn]
2
)
≥
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/4r
)R¯
(1.6)
if the conditioning event has a strictly positive probability.
Proof. First, note that there are at most R¯ seats reserved for minorities, which also im-
plies the maximum number of schools implemented with minority reserve policy (i.e.
allocate one minority reserved seat to one school). Let C1 be the set of schools im-
plemented with minority reserve policy and are tentatively matched to one minority
student in its r(m) at the end of Loop 1. Recall the condition (4) of Deﬁnition 1.6,
which can be rewritten as
∑
c∈C1
pc ≤ rR¯ ·min
c∈C
{pc}
Also, denote C2 as a set of schools belong to Xn. Obviously,
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∑
c∈C2
pc ≥ Xn ·min
c∈C
{pc}
I am interested in computing the probability that in Round 1 of Step (3) of Algo-
rithm 1. That is the probability when a majority student applies to some school
not in C1, which is bounded below by:
1−
∑
c∈C1 pc∑
c∈C2 pc +
∑
c∈C1 pc
≥ 1− R¯
Xn
r
+ R¯
> 1− R¯
E[Xn]/2
r
+ R¯
Now assume that in all Rounds 1, . . . , j − 1, no majority matches to schools in
C1. Then there are still at least Xn − (j − 1) schools which are either not listed
by any minorities, or matched with some minorities but without minority reserved
seat(s). This follows since at most j−1 schools have had their seats ﬁlled in Rounds
1, . . . , j − 1 from the set of schools in Vn. Similar to the above procedures, I can
compute that in Round j, the probability that the Sequential SOSM-R produces
the same match before and after implementing a (stronger) aﬃrmative action policy
is at least,
1− R¯
Xn−(j−1)
r
+ R¯
> 1− R¯
E[Xn]/2−(j−1)
r
+ R¯
Since there are at most R¯ minorities can be replaced by majorities from their mi-
nority reserved seats ex ante, the probability that Algorithm 1 produces a matching
without initiating a rejection chain after a (stronger) aﬃrmative action policy (con-
ditional on Xn >
E[Xn]
2
) is at least,
R¯∏
j=1
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/2−(j−1)
r
+ R¯
)
≥
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/2−(R¯−1)
r
+ R¯
)R¯
≥
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/4r
)R¯
where the ﬁrst inequality follows as j ≤ R¯, j ∈ {1, . . . , R¯}. The second inequality
holds since E[Xn]/2 − R¯ + 1 ≥ E[Xn]/4 > 0, which follows from Lemma 1.3 and
the assumption that n is suﬃciently large. 
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The last step is to show that the unconditional type-speciﬁc acyclic probability con-
verges to one as the market becomes large, which can be veriﬁed through the following
inequalities.
Pr
(
Γˆn,tsc
)
≥ Pr
(
Xn >
E[Xn]
2
)
·
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/4r
)R¯
≥
(
1− 4
E[Xn]
)
·
(
1− R¯
E[Xn]/4r
)R¯
≥
(
1− 8e
16λk
n
)
·
(
1− 8rR¯e
16λk
n
)R¯
The ﬁrst inequality is given by Equation (1.6) (of Lemma 1.4). The second inequality
follows the result by Kojima et al. (2013),34 and the last inequality is given by Lemma
1.3.
For the two items of the last line, it is obvious that the ﬁrst item converges to one as
n → ∞. For the second item, recall that there exists b > 0, such that R¯ < bna, for any n
(condition (4) of Deﬁnition 1.6). Therefore,
(
1− 8rR¯e
16λk
n
)R¯
>
(
1− 8rbn
ae16λk
n
)bna
=
(
1− 8rbe
16λk
n1−a
)n1−abn2a−1
≥ (e8rbe−16λk)bn2a−1
where the last inequality follows as (1 − β
x
)x ≥ e−β, when β, x > 0. Since I assume
a ∈ [0, 1
2
), the term n2a−1 converges to zero as n → ∞. Thus, (e8rbe−16λk)bn2a−1 converges to
one as n → ∞. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.4, given the (material) equivalence
between type-speciﬁc acyclicity and respecting the spirit of a stronger minority reserve
(Lemma 1.1). 
34 In short, ﬁrst Pr[Xn ≤ E[Xn]2 ] ≤ Pr[Xn ≤ E[Xn]2 ] +Pr[Xn ≥ 3E[Xn]2 ] = Pr[|Xn −E[Xn]| ≥ E[Xn]2 ] ≤
V ar[xn]
(E[Xn]/2)2
, where the ﬁrst inequality is by the fact that any probability is non-negative and less than
or equal to one, and the second inequality is given by the Chebychev inequality. Next, use the result
V ar[Xn] ≤ E[Xn] by Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), I get Pr[Xn ≤ E[Xn]2 ] ≤ 4E[Xn] .
51
Bibliography
A. Abdulkadirog˘lu. College admissions with aﬃrmative action. International Journal of
Game Theory, 33(4):535–549, 2005.
A. Abdulkadirog˘lu and T. So¨nmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer-
ican Economic Review, pages 729–747, 2003.
Orhan Aygu¨n and Inacio Bo. College admissions with multidimensional reserves: the
brazillian aﬃrmative action case. Technical report, Mimeo, 2013.
Michel Balinski and Tayfun So¨nmez. A tale of two mechanisms: student placement.
Journal of Economic theory, 84(1):73–94, 1999.
Sebastian Braun, Nadja Dwenger, Dorothea Ku¨bler, and Alexander Westkamp. Imple-
menting quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 85:232–251, 2014.
Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux. Eﬃciency and stability in large matching markets.
Mimeo, 2015.
Y.K. Che and F. Kojima. Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random
priority mechanisms. Econometrica, 78(5):1625–1672, 2010.
Battal Dog˘an. Responsive aﬃrmative action in school choice. Journal of Economic
Theory, 165:69–105, 2016.
Federico Echenique and Bumin Yenmez. How to control controlled school choice. Unpub-
lished working paper, Caltech, 2012.
Lars Ehlers, Isa E Hafalir, M Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed A Yildirim. School choice
with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 2014.
Aytek Erdil and Taro Kumano. Prioritizing diversity in school choice. Unpublished working
paper, Washington University, 1, 2012.
H.I. Ergin. Eﬃcient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica, 70(6):
2489–2497, 2002.
D. Gale and L.S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American
52
Mathematical Monthly, 69(1):9–15, 1962.
Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn. Constrained school choice. Journal of Economic
Theory, 144(5):1921–1947, 2009.
Isa E Hafalir, M Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed A Yildirim. Eﬀective aﬃrmative action
in school choice. Theoretical Economics, 8(2):325–363, 2013.
N. Immorlica and M. Mahdian. Marriage, honesty, and stability. In Proceedings of the
sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 53–62. Society
for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2005.
Onur Kesten. On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems.
Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1):155–171, 2006.
Onur Kesten. School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3):1297–
1348, 2010.
Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, and Marc Vorsatz. Aﬃrmative action through minority reserves:
An experimental study on school choice. Economics Letters, 139:72–75, 2016.
D.E. Knuth, R. Motwani, and B. Pittel. Stable husbands. In Proceedings of the ﬁrst annual
ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 397–404. Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, 1990.
F. Kojima and P.A. Pathak. Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets.
American Economic Review, 99(3):608–627, 2009.
Fuhito Kojima. School choice: Impossibilities for aﬃrmative action. Games and Economic
Behavior, 75(2):685–693, 2012.
Fuhito Kojima, Parag A Pathak, and Alvin E Roth. Matching with couples: Stability
and incentives in large markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4):1585–1632,
2013.
Taro Kumano. Strategy-proofness and stability of the boston mechanism: An almost
impossibility result. Journal of Public Economics, 105:23–29, 2013.
A.E. Roth. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case
study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy, pages 991–1016, 1984.
53
A.E. Roth and M.A.O. Sotomayor. Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic mod-
eling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990.
Alvin E Roth. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open ques-
tions. International Journal of Game Theory, 36(3-4):537–569, 2008.
L. Shapley and H. Scarf. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of mathematical economics,
1(1):23–37, 1974.
Tayfun So¨nmez and M Utku U¨nver. Matching, allocation, and exchange of discrete re-
sources. Handbook of Social Economics, 1:781–852, 2011.
Alexander Westkamp. An analysis of the german university admissions system. Economic
Theory, 53(3):561–589, 2013.
54
2. MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS WITH EX ANTE ASYMMETRIC
BIDDERS: UNIFORM VS DISCRIMINATORY
Yun Liu∗
Abstract: This paper studies how ex ante diﬀerences in bidders’ values aﬀect their be-
havior in two standard multi-unit auction formats, uniform-price auction (UPA) and
discriminatory-price auction (DPA). I characterize the set of asymmetric monotone Bayes–
Nash equilibria in a simple multi-unit auction game in which two units of a homogeneous
object are auctioned among a set of bidders with independent private values. I show
that if a bidder possesses a stronger market position, she has less incentive to shade her
bid for the second unit in a UPA, whereas in a DPA, weaker bidders tend to bid more
aggressively on both of two units.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D44
Keywords: multi-unit auctions, ex ante asymmetry.
2.1 Introduction
Auction markets with goods (assets) worth trillions of dollars are held every year around
the world. Some noticeable examples include treasury bill, electricity, spectrum, oil
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drilling rights, and mineral rights. In most of these markets, the seller supplies more
than one unit of goods, while bidders can also submit diﬀerent prices for each unit on
sale and there can be more than one winner.1 Partly because of their intrinsic analytic
complexity, most extant literature of multi-unit auctions is restricted to the symmetric
environment in which all bidders have the same valuation distribution. Symmetry gives
a proper abstraction of the complex market environment when there are many small
bidders. However, in circumstances with only a handful of qualiﬁed participants (e.g.,
procurement auctions), asymmetry may be a more reasonable assumption. For instance,
in whole electricity markets, market incumbents are more likely to enjoy a competition
advantage over newcomers through their lower marginal production costs.
In this paper, I am interested in understanding how ex ante diﬀerences in bidders’
distributions of valuations aﬀect their behavior in two popular simultaneous sealed-bid
multi-unit auction formats, discriminatory-price auction (henceforth DPA, also known as
pay-as-bid auction) and uniform-price auction (henceforth UPA). In both auction formats,
bidders submit bidding schedules that specify prices for diﬀerent units. The seller then
aggregates all submitted schedules to determine the market-clearing price, and winning
bidders are allocated units for which their bids exceed the market-clearing price. These
two formats diﬀer in terms of payment rules: all winning bids are ﬁlled at the market-
clearing price in the UPA, whereas in the DPA bidders pay their own bids for each of
their winning units.
I study an auction market in which two units of an identical and indivisible good are
sold to a set of ex ante asymmetric bidders, each with diminishing marginal values for the
successive units. A bidder is stronger in the sense that she is more likely to have higher
values for both units of the good than a weaker bidder. Such a feature is captured by
imposing a standard stochastic dominance property to bidders’ value distributions (see,
for example, Lebrun (1999), Waehrer (1999), Maskin and Riley (2000), and Cantillon
(2008), who have used this property to study asymmetric single-unit auctions).2
1 In this paper, I only discuss auctions with multiple copies of a homogeneous good, i.e., multi-unit
auction. Auctions with heterogeneous goods are normally called multi-item auctions (See Chapter 4), or
combinatorial auction if bids for packages are allowed.
2 To my knowledge, the only exception to the assumption of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (or
stronger) is Kirkegaard (2009). Instead of analyzing the system of diﬀerential equations that determines
bidding strategies, Kirkegaard studies asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions by comparing the ratio of bidders’
(endogenous) payoﬀs to the ratio of their (exogenous) distribution functions.
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a,b) provide thorough analyses of the two multi-
unit auction formats when the good is indivisible.3 In particular, Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn (1998b) reveal the eﬀect of demand reduction in the UPA, which reﬂects a
bidder’s strategic shading of all her bids except on the ﬁrst unit.4 The presence of strate-
gic demand reduction not only causes allocation ineﬃciencies, and consequently a lower
expected revenue for the seller; more importantly the diverse levels of bid shading signiﬁ-
cantly complicate the analyses of equilibrium bidding strategies in the UPA when bidders
hold private information. Even though the UPA rules is the analog of second-price auction
beyond the single-unit case, in most cases we can only depict bidders’ equilibrium strate-
gies through a system of diﬀerential equations instead of having truthful reporting as their
dominant strategies. Furthermore, the problems of multiplicity and non-monotonicity of
equilibria are also prevalent in UPA. These theoretical challenges in analyzing auctions
beyond the single-unit case have led to most progress in the multi-unit auction literature
in the past decade coming from the empirical side, which aims to provide environment-
speciﬁc revenue comparisons among diﬀerent auction formats, especially between a DPA
and a UPA.5
This paper contributes to the literature by providing new equilibria characterizations
for the DPA and the UPA when bidders have diﬀerent valuation distributions. In an
asymmetric DPA, my results imply that a weaker bidder tends to bid more aggressively
on both units compared with her relatively stronger competitors (Theorem 2.1). As the
direct extension of the ﬁrst-price auction into multi-unit cases, the asymmetric equilibrium
strategies in the DPA echo an analogous pattern, as in the case of asymmetric ﬁrst-price
auctions (Lebrun, 1999, Maskin and Riley, 2000). I further argue that in the DPA, a
stronger bidder is more likely to pool her two bids (i.e., submit the same bid for both of
the two units, even if she values them diﬀerently) than a weaker bidder. By contrast, I
ﬁnd that in the UPA a stronger bidder tends to decrease the level of demand reduction
3 An alternative approach is to consider a perfectly divisible good for which each bidder submits a
continuous demand (bid) function for a share of the good (Wilson, 1979, Back and Zender, 1993, Ausubel
et al., 2014). Although the assumption of a perfectly divisible good gives undeniable analytic convenience
for revenue ranking in diﬀerent multi-unit auction formats, this approach explicitly avoids the multi-
dimensional origin of multi-unit auctions by assuming a single-dimensional linear type for all bidders.
4 See also Noussair (1995) for an earlier contribution.
5 The empirical multi-unit auction literature is quite abundant; among others, interested readers can
refer to Athey and Haile (2007), Hickman et al. (2012) for two excellent reviews of the related literature.
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compared with a weaker bidder when both of their valuations for the second unit are above
the corresponding threshold values for nonzero bids (Theorem 2.2). Because strategic
demand reduction is likely to create both an ineﬃcient allocation and lower revenues for
the seller, the DPA seems to be a better candidate than the UPA when the eﬀect of
demand reduction is severe. My results, however, imply that the unsatisfactory eﬀects of
demand reduction in the UPA are partly remitted by the presence of asymmetric bidders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model and as-
sumptions. Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 provide characterization results of asymmetric
UPA and DPA respectively. Section 2.5 concludes with discussions. All proofs are clus-
tered in Appendix 2.6.
2.2 Model
Two indivisible and identical units of a good are auctioned among a set of risk neutral
and payoﬀ-maximizing bidders, N = {1, . . . , n}, |N | ≥ 2.6 The seller’s valuation to keep
unsold units is zero, and all bidders bid for both units on sale. Each bidder has a pair
of valuations vi = (v
h
i , v
l
i), i ∈ N , for the two successive units. vhi ≥ vli with probability
one. vi is privately known and independently distributed across bidders according to a
continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function Fi(v
h
i , v
l
i) with support on vi ∈ [0, v¯] ⊂
R2+. Let F
h
i (v
h
i ) and F
l
i (v
l
i) denote the two marginal distributions of Fi. The information
of Fi and its two marginal distributions is common knowledge.
Bidders are asymmetric if Fi(v) = Fj(v) for some i = j and for a non-zero measure of
valuations v. Therefore, the vector of bidders’ valuation distributions F = (F1, . . . , Fn) es-
sentially describes the market environment; in particular, F−i = (F1, . . . , Fi−1, Fi+1, . . . , Fn)
gives a characterization of the market competition faced by bidder i. As I want to un-
derstand how asymmetries aﬀect bidders’ optimal bidding strategies, one way of doing
this is through a simple but important class of power distributions. Denote Fi(vi) =
F (vi)αi , where F is a continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function with support on
vi ∈ [0, v¯] ⊂ R2+, and αi ∈ R+. We call the vector of real numbers α = (α1, . . . , αn) a
conﬁguration of an auction market with F, and denote κi =
∑
j∈N\i αj.
6 Throughout, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
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Two popular simultaneous sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats are discussed in this
paper, the uniform-price auction (UPA) and the discriminatory-price auction (DPA). In
both auction formats, each bidder i submits a pair of two bids bhi and b
l
i for the ﬁrst and
second units of the good on sale respectively, bhi ≥ bli. Denote by bmi (vi), m = h, l, the
bidding strategy of bidder i for the mth unit. The equilibrium concept used in this paper
is the usual Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and is simply referred to as the equilibrium. Within
the independent private values information framework, we know there exists at least one
pure strategy equilibrium when bidders are ex ante asymmetric.7
2.3 Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Discriminatory-price Auctions
In a DPA, bidders pay the price they bid for each of the units they win. Write the bid
bm in the DPA as φm, m = h, l. From the perspective of a bidder i, there are 2(n − 1)
competing bids (with equal number of high bids and low bids, and may include zero bids),
which are random variables that depend on her rivals’ bidding strategies and their own
value distributions. Denote c1 and c2 as the highest and second highest bids from all of
i’s rivals. Since the auction involves two units for sale, the distributions of c1 and c2 will
be particularly relevant to our analysis. Let G1i denote the distribution of the highest
competing bid c1, and G2i the distribution of c
2.
When bidder i submits a pair of bids (φhi , φ
l
i), her expected payoﬀ is
πi(φ
h
i , φ
l
i; v
h
i , v
l
i) = (v
h
i − φhi )G2i (φhi ) + (vli − φli)G1i (φli) (2.1)
where G2i (φ
h
i ) represents the probability that bidder i wins the ﬁrst unit when her high
bid φhi is higher than the second highest competing bid c
2; she wins the second unit when
her low bid φli is higher than the highest competing bid c
1 with probability G1i (φ
l
i).
Writing down the explicit equilibrium strategies in multi-unit auctions is notoriously
diﬃcult. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a) and Chakraborty (2006) have provided
7 Reny (1999) shows that a pure strategy equilibrium exists in a class of discontinuous games as long
as no strategies create a discontinuous payoﬀ decrease, which includes the asymmetric discriminatory-
price auction case; Jackson and Swinkels (2005) further prove the existence of a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium in a general class of auction games, which also includes the asymmetric uniform-price auction
case.
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some important equilibrium characterizations of the DPA via the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Within the independent (across bidders) and private value framework, their characteriza-
tion results are applicable with my ex ante asymmetry assumption as long as each bidder’s
equilibrium strategies can be derived from maximizing Equation (2.1) with respect to the
high bid φhi and low bid φ
l
i respectively. However, instead of the identical ﬁrst-order con-
ditions for all bidders, we will have a system of equations for each bidder given their G1i
and G2i . I employ the following of their results as the premises for my analysis.
Lemma 2.1: In any equilibrium of the two-unit discriminatory-price auction with inde-
pendent private values, i ∈ N
(i) πi(φ
h
i , φ
l
i; v
h
i , v
l
i) is diﬀerentiable for all relevant bids;
(ii) φmi (v
h
i , v
l
i), m = h, l is weakly increasing with v
m
i , and 0 ≤ φmi ≤ vmi , m = h, l;
(iii) all equilibrium bids can be obtained by solving
max
φhi
(vhi − φhi )G2i (φhi ) and max
φli
(vli − φli)G1i (φli) (2.2)
Lemma 2.1 guarantees that all equilibrium strategies can be represented by the ﬁrst-
order conditions from the bidders’ expected payoﬀ maximization problem; in particular,
part (iii) states that for each bidder her bids for the two units can be decided separably.
One important analytic advantage from my value distribution assumption F (v)αi is
the direct application of some standard stochastic dominance properties. I show that the
marginal distribution of the highest competing bid G1i and the marginal distribution of
the second highest competing bid G2i can both be ranked through the reverse hazard rate
dominance for bidders with diﬀerent κ.8
Lemma 2.2: Given a conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), if κj ≥ κi, i, j ∈ N , then G1j (and G2j
resp.) dominates G1i (and G
2
i resp.) in terms of the reverse hazard rate.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.1. 
Recall that for each bidder i, I denote κi =
∑
j∈N\i αj as a measure of the aggregate
competition from other bidders. Lemma 2.2 formalizes the intuition that when facing a
8 Given two distribution functions G1 and G2, G1 dominates G2 in terms of the reverse hazard rate if,
for all x ∈ [0, x¯], g1(x)G1(x) ≥
g2(x)
G2(x)
.
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lower level of market competition, i.e., a smaller κ, a bidder is more likely to win when
submitting the same bid.
Theorem 2.1: Given a conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), if κj ≥ κi, i, j ∈ N , then
(i) φhi (v
h) ≤ φhj (vh), for all vh ∈ [0, v¯];
(ii) φli(v
l) ≤ φlj(vl), for all vl ∈ [0, v¯].
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.2. 
Part (i) (resp. part (ii)) of Theorem 2.1 implies that a bidder bids more aggressively
with her high (resp. low) bid when she expects to face with stronger competitors in the
market (i.e., a larger κ), regardless of her realized value of the other unit. Let a bidder
facing with a smaller (resp. larger) κ as the stronger (resp. weaker) bidder, Theorem 2.1
reveals an analogous fashion of bid shading to the asymmetric ﬁrst-price auction in which
a weaker bidder bids more aggressively compared to her stronger competitors (Lebrun,
1999, Maskin and Riley, 2000).
As a bidder is more likely to further shade her high bid if she expects a modest
level of market competition, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a) have shown that for
each bidder, separating (i.e., φh = φl) and pooling (i.e., φh = φl) her two bids coexist
with positive probability in equilibrium. In particular, there exists an iso-bid line in
which a bidder is indiﬀerent between pooling and separating her high and low bids made
in equilibrium (see the dashed curve in Figure 2.1). Even though I cannot rule out
the coexistence of separating and pooled bids in equilibrium, Theorem 2.1 implies that
introducing bidders with heterogeneous value distributions alters the shape of the iso-bid
line.
Remark 2.1: A bidder will increase (resp. decrease) the region of pooled bids when she
expects less (resp. more) ﬁerce competition from other bidders.
To see this, let (vˆh, vˆl) be a pair of values belonging to the iso-bid line, i.e., φh(vˆh, vˆl) =
φl(vˆh, vˆl), but φh(vˆh+, vˆl) = φl(vˆh+, vˆl) and φh(vˆh, vˆl−) = φl(vˆh, vˆl−). Equivalently,
I can write φ = vˆh − BSh = vˆl − BSl, where BSm represents the level of bid shading,
m = h, l. If the bidder faces less ﬁerce competition from other bidders, i.e., κˆ ≤ κ, by
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vh
vl
0
P
S
(v¯, v¯)
(vˆh, vˆl)
Fig. 2.1: Pooled (P) and separated (S) bids in an asymmetric DPA
Theorem 2.1 we know that ˆBSm(vm) ≥ BSm(vm), vm ∈ [0, v¯], m = h, l. In addition, for
a given v and a given κ, BSl(v) ≤ BSh(v) with probability one. To ensure vˆh remains
on the iso-bid line, we need a higher valuation for the ﬁrst unit vh > vˆh. This implies a
rightward shift of the iso-bid line. Similar arguments for vˆl suggest a downward shift of
the iso-bid line.
2.4 Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Uniform-price Auctions
In a UPA, all winning bidders pay the same price for each unit they win, where the
market-clearing price is set at the highest losing bid. Let ϕhi and ϕ
l
i be i’s bid for the
ﬁrst and second unit of the good, respectively. Similar to the DPA case, as each bidder is
facing 2(n− 1) competing bids, I denote by Hi the distribution from which the 2(n− 1)
competing bids are drawn, which reﬂects i’s belief of possible competition from a set of ex
ante asymmetric competitors. Let c1 and c2 be the highest and second highest competing
bids from all of i’s rivals. H1i denotes the distribution of the highest competing bid c
1
with density h1i , and H
2
i the distribution of c
2 with density h2i .
Given the strategies of all other bidders, the corresponding expected payoﬀ of a bidder
with value (vhi , v
l
i) and bids (ϕ
h
i , ϕ
l
i) is
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πi(ϕ
h
i , ϕ
l
i; v
h
i , v
l
i) = (v
h
i + v
l
i)H
1
i (ϕ
l
i)− 2
∫ ϕli
0
c1h1i (c
1) dc1
+ vhi [H
2
i (ϕ
h
i )−H1i (ϕli)]− ϕli[H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)]−
∫ ϕhi
ϕli
c2h2i (c
2) dc2
(2.3)
where the ﬁrst line describes i’s expected payoﬀ when she wins both units, i.e., i’s
low bid ϕli defeats all competing bids and win two units with probability H
1
i (ϕ
l
i). The
second line is the case in which she wins one unit with probability H2i (ϕ
h
i ) − H1i (ϕli).
H2i (ϕ
l
i)−H1i (ϕli) represents the probability that the market-clearing price is ϕli.
The diﬃculty of equilibrium characterization in the UPA comes not only from the
lack of closed-form expressions of equilibrium strategies, as is the case with the DPA, but
more importantly, from the possible discontinuities in bidding functions and the prevalent
presence of equilibria multiplicity.9 Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) provide a
relatively tractable method to characterize the equilibria of low bid ϕli in undominated
strategies. I follow their approach and extend their insights to incorporate the case with
ex ante asymmetric bidders.
Let γi(v) be a weakly increasing function representing the low bid as a function of
valuation, and write its inverse function as
γ−1i (ϕ
l
i) ≡ sup{x|γi(x) < ϕli}
which gives the highest possible value for bidding below ϕli. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn (1998b) have shown that the set of undominated strategies in the UPA with
independent private values involves submitting their true valuations for the ﬁrst unit
ϕhi (v
h
i ) = v
h
i , and bidding no greater than their valuations for the second unit ϕ
l
i(v
l
i) ≤ vli,
i ∈ N . Replacing ϕhi by vhi in Equation (2.3), I can diﬀerentiate πi(ϕhi , ϕli; vhi , vli) with
respect to ϕli when ϕ
l
i > 0,
9 A series of examples in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) clearly demonstrates the sensitivity
of bidders’ strategies to the changes of their value distributions which includes bidding functions with
discontinuities. Ausubel et al. (2014) illustrate an example with two bidders and two units in which
bidders always bid truthfully on the ﬁrst unit; however, submitting truthful bid or zero bid on the second
unit are both in equilibrium if the other bidder chooses the same behavior.
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∂πi
∂ϕli
= (vli − ϕli)h1i (ϕli)− [H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)] (2.4)
Equation (2.4) gives a necessary condition for i’s optimal nonzero low bids after equat-
ing it to zero. Recall that H1i and H
2
i are the respective distributions of the highest two
competing bids c1 and c2 conditional on κi. H
1
i (ϕ
l
i) thus represents the probability of
winning both units, which is the event that the realized values from all competing bidders
are less than or equal to ϕli. Therefore, I can write H
1
i (ϕ
l
i) =
∏
j∈N\i F
h
j (ϕ
l
i), and the
corresponding probability density function h1i (ϕ
l
i) =
∑
j f
h
j (ϕ
l
i)
∏
k =i,j F
h
k (ϕ
l
i).
Accordingly, H2i (ϕ
l
i) is the probability that the second highest competing bid c
2 is less
than or equal to ϕli, which is the union of the following disjoint events: (i) ϕ
l
i beats the
highest competing bid c1; (ii) the high bids from n − 2 bidders are less than or equal to
ϕli and one is greater than ϕ
l
i,
H2i (ϕ
l
i) =
∏
j∈N\i
F hj (ϕ
l
i) +
∑
j∈N\i
∏
k =i,j
F hk (ϕ
l
i)
(
F lj(γ
−1
i (ϕ
l
i))− F hj (ϕli)
)
(2.5)
where the summation ranges over all possible bidders. I can now rewrite the right-hand
side of Equation (2.4) as
∏
k∈N\i,j
F hk (ϕ
l
i)
[∑
j =i
fhj (ϕ
l
i) (v
l
i − ϕli) + F hj (ϕli)− F lj(vli)
]
Deﬁne
Γi(ϕ
l
i; v
l
i) =
∫ ϕli
0
∏
k∈N\i,j
F hk (x)
[∑
j =i
fhj (x) (v
l
i − x) + F hj (x)− F lj(vli)
]
dx
and
Ci(v
l
i) = argmax
ϕli∈[0,v¯]
Γ(ϕli; v
l
i)
Ci(v) is an increasing correspondence if v < vˆ, ϕ ∈ Ci(v) and ϕˆ ∈ Ci(vˆ), we have
ϕ ≤ ϕˆ. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b) have shown that if Ci(vli) is an increasing
correspondence and ϕli(v
l
i) is a selection from Ci(v
l
i), then for each v
l
i ∈ [0, v¯], either ϕli = 0
or ϕli ∈ C ′i(vli), where C ′i is the set of solutions to
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∑
j =i
fhj (ϕ
l
i) (v
l
i − ϕli) + F hj (ϕli)− F lj(vli) = 0 (2.6)
i.e., i’s optimal nonzero low bid must be an interior local maximum of Γi. As each
bidder follows her low bid strategy γi(v) in equilibrium which is weakly increasing by
assumption, and obviously ϕli(0) = 0 and ϕ
l
i(v¯) = v¯,
10 we know there is a unique threshold
value of the nonzero bid v∗i ∈ [0, v¯], such that for all vli ∈ [0, v∗i ), bidding zero for the
second unit gives a higher expected payoﬀ, i.e., Γ(0; vli) > Γ(ϕ
l
i; v
l
i); and for v
l
i ∈ (v∗i , v¯],
Γ(0; vli) < Γ(ϕ
l
i; v
l
i). The arguments upon this point suﬃce the following result.
Proposition 2.1: For a given conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), there is an equilibrium in the
uniform-price auction with independent private values, such that
(
ϕhi (v
h
i ), ϕ
l
i(v
l
i)
)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(vhi , 0) for v
h
i ∈ [0, v¯], vli ∈ [0, v∗i )
(vhi , ϕ
l∗
i ) for v
h
i ∈ [0, v¯], vli ∈ (v∗i , v¯]
(2.7)
where ϕl∗i ∈ C ′i(vli), i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 2.1 characterizes the threshold value v∗i for nonzero low bids, which also
implies that the equilibrium bidding strategy for the second unit ϕli(v
l
i), i ∈ N , comes from
the real-number solutions of Equation (2.6) when vli ∈ (v∗i , v¯]. Clearly, both v∗i and ϕli(vli)
are identical to all bidders when the market is ex ante symmetric, i.e., Fi(v) = Fj(v),
∀ i, j ∈ N . However, as indicated by Equation (2.6), bidders will have diﬀerent equilibrium
bidding strategies for the second unit once I introduce asymmetries through the market
conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), i.e., Fi(v) = F (v)αi and αi = αj, ∃ i, j ∈ N . The experimental
results from Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006) imply that the threshold value for nonzero
low bids v∗i monotonically decreases (but does not converge to zero) with the increase
in the number of homogeneous bidders in the market. Given the assumption of a ﬁxed
set of bidders, instead of investigating the eﬀect of new entrants, I am interested in how
v∗i and ϕ
l∗
i will vary with our measure of the expected market competition κi, where
κi =
∑
j∈N\i αj.
10 When the realized value of the second unit is 0, all nonzero low bids are strictly dominated by bidding
0 on the second unit. When vli = v¯, it is with probability one that maxj =i vj < v¯ given Fj is atomless
for all j ∈ N\i. Bidder i is certain to win both units when bidding truthfully, whereas any other low bid
with a positive level of bid shading will reduce her winning probability and is strictly dominated.
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Example 2.1: Consider an auction market with two asymmetric bidders {1, 2} and two
units of a homogeneous good. Let (α1, α2) be its conﬁguration, α1 = α2, α1 + α2 = 2,
αi ∈ (0, 2), i = 1, 2. Each of the two bidders independently draws their valuations for the
two units from
Di(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for x ≤ 0
xαi for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
1 for 1 ≤ x
with densities di(x) = αix
αi−1. Therefore, F hi (x) = (Di(x))
2 and F li (x) = 2Di(x) −
(Di(x))
2 give bidder i’s respective marginal distributions of the ﬁrst and second unit.
Case (i). α1 ∈ (0, 1.5]. (vhi , 0), i = 1, 2 is the unique equilibrium, as there is no
real-number solution to Equation (2.6).11
Case (ii). α1 ∈ (1.5, 2). That is, bidder 1 becomes suﬃciently stronger than her
competitor. I can solve ϕli(v
l
i), i = 1, 2, via Equation (2.6), which gives
2αj(ϕ
l
i)
2αj−1(vli − ϕli) + (ϕli)2αj −
(
2(vli)
αj − (vli)2αj
)
= 0
Figure 2.2 depicts the numerical calculations for bidder 1’s low bid functions when her
competitor has α2 = 0.4 and α2 = 0.1. However, (v
h
2 , 0) is still the unique equilibrium for
bidder 2. Clearly, bidder 1 bids more aggressively (i.e., reducing the diﬀerence between
vl1 and ϕ
l
1(v
l
1) for each v
l
1 ∈ [0, 1]), when her competitor turns to be even weaker (i.e., α2
is decreased from 0.4 to 0.1).
For the threshold value of nonzero bid v∗, recall that in Case (i) both of the two
bidders submit zero bids on the second unit, which implies that when α1 ∈ (0, 1.5], the
threshold value for nonzero bids v∗i is at least 1 for vi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2. When α1 > 1.5,
v∗1 reduces to 0 given the monotonic increasing bid function from ϕ
l
1(0) = 0 to ϕ
l
1(1) = 1
for bidder 1; however, v∗2 is still at least 1, as (v
h
2 , 0) is the only equilibrium for bidder 2
11 When the two bidders are identical in term of value distributions, i.e., α1 = α2 = 1. Di is essentially
uniformly distributed. The examples in Ausubel et al. (2014) have shown that bidding truthfully on the
ﬁrst unit whereas submitting zero bid on the second unit is the only equilibrium when vhi > v
l
i with
probability one. However, if the two bidders have constant values for the two units vhi = v
l
i, i = 1, 2, we
further encounter the problem of multiple equilibria such that both the single-unit bid equilibrium (vhi , 0)
and the truthful bidding equilibrium (vi, vi) coexist with nonzero probability.
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Fig. 2.2
in both cases.
If I ﬁx
∑
i αi in a given conﬁguration and treat αi as a measure of i’s own market
position, a higher αi thus implies a lower κi, i.e. a market with less aggressive competitors.
Example 2.1 illustrates that when a bidder expects to possess a better market position
with less intense competition from other bidders, she tends to lower her threshold value
for nonzero low bids and submits higher bids for each realized value of the second unit.
In the rest of this section, I will show that such asymmetric bidding pattern is generally
valid in the UPA providing that the valuation distributions of any two diﬀerent bidders
can be stochastically ordered.
First, I introduce the following lemma to describe the stochastic dominance relations
of H1i the distribution of the highest competing bid and H
2
i the distribution of the second
highest competing bid, conditional on κ the measure of market competition.
Lemma 2.3: Given a conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), if κj ≥ κi, i, j ∈ N , then H1j (resp. H2j )
dominates H1i (resp. H
2
i ) in terms of the hazard rate.
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Similar to Lemma 2.2, Lemma 2.3 implies that a bidder expects to face higher (resp.
lower) competing bids when she has a relatively weaker (resp. stronger) market position,
i.e., a larger (resp. smaller) κ. To justify Lemma 2.3, I need to demonstrate that the
stochastic dominance relations in bidders’ valuation distributions can be converted to their
corresponding pairs of H1 and H2. From Proposition 2.1, we know that each bidder’s high
bid is separable from her low bid; in addition, the independent private values assumption
implies that a bidder’s two bids are independent from all her competing bids. Thus, for
each bidder i I can treat her 2(n− 1) competing bids are independently drawn from the
distribution Hi. Because all bidders bid submit their true valuations for the high bids,
and their low bids are either zero or come from the weakly increasing function γi(v
l
i),
i ∈ N , I can inverse each of her 2(n−1) competing bids to its corresponding values which
is drawn from either F hj (for the ﬁrst unit) or F
l
j (for the second unit), j ∈ N\i. The rest
of the proof follows the arguments as that of Lemma 2.2, and is omitted.
I am now ready to present the following equilibrium characterizations of the UPA with
ex ante asymmetric bidders.
Theorem 2.2: Given a conﬁguration (α1, . . . , αn), if κj ≥ κi, i, j ∈ N , then
(i) v∗i ≤ v∗j ;
(ii) ϕli(v
l) ≥ ϕlj(vl), for all vl ∈ [0, v¯].
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.3. 
In words, Theorem 2.2 says that when bidder i has a relatively strong market po-
sition with less aggressive bidders (i.e., a lower κ), she tends to bid more aggressively
on the second unit in the UPA in term of both a lower threshold value for nonzero bids
(Part (i)), and a higher nonzero low bid for each realized value of the second unit (Part
(ii)). Ausubel et al. (2014) argue that although demand reduction in the UPA brings a
superﬁcially lower level of market demand, and in most cases, results in an unsatisﬁed
market-clearing price for the seller, such welfare loss is nevertheless oﬀset by allowing
smaller market participants more room to survive, which may further encourage compe-
tition and innovation. Theorem 2.2, however, points to the opposite situation: stronger
bidders are also more likely to submit higher bids in the UPA and seize a larger market
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share, whereas weaker bidders foresee their lower winning chances and are less likely to
participate in the market, especially when participating requires non-negligible eﬀort or
monetary cost (e.g., research contests in the form of an all-pay auction). In addition, as
I will discuss in Chapter 3, the asymmetric UPA also fosters bidders’ incentives to form
larger coalitions, which is clearly not conducive to promoting market competition.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presents new equilibrium characterizations for asymmetric discriminatory-
price and uniform-price auctions with privately informed bidders. I argue that bidders’
distinct strategic behavior essentially comes from their diverse market positions (i.e., the
winning probability and the probability of deciding the market-clearing price), which is
measured by a conﬁguration α of the diﬀerences in their valuation distributions. Instead
of deriving a system of diﬀerential ﬁrst-order conditions for the DPA and the UPA, which
quickly becomes intractable given its multi-dimensional nature, I identify the compara-
tive statics of equilibrium sets between two asymmetric bidders through the stochastic
dominance relations in their valuation distributions.
Conceptually, we can treat multi-unit auctions as the simplest case of a multi-dimensional
resource allocation problem. Thus, besides its practical relevance, having more compre-
hensive analyses of bidders’ behavior in markets with multiple objects is a nontrivial
question in auction theory. Here, I mention a few possible directions for future research.
First, even if providing a general result of revenue rankings among diﬀerent multi-unit
auction formats is diﬃcult, comparing revenues among markets with diﬀerent degrees
of bidders’ asymmetry is still appealing, which may also contain fewer technical chal-
lenges.12 Second, I have thus far only considered bidders’ collusion incentives at the ex
ante stage, which includes asymmetries that arise from mergers or joint bidding before
bidders receive their private information. Analyzing bidders’ interim collusion behavior in
single-item auctions has been widely discussed in the existing literature. However, since
each coalition will face diﬀerent incentive compatibility and participation constraints from
its members given their realized valuations of the two units, characterizing bidders’ in-
12 See, for example, Cantillon (2008) who shows that a higher degree of asymmetries among bidders
reduces the seller’s expected revenue in both ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions.
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terim collusive strategies in a multi-unit auction even with the conventional independent
private values setting appears to be a technically nontrivial exercise. Last, it would also
be interesting to examine my results through experimental evidences.13
2.6 Appendix for Chapter 2
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
I use some established stochastic ordering results from Karlin and Rinott (1980) to com-
plete the proof. First, note that from the perspective of each bidder i, she is facing 2(n−1)
bids (with equal number of high bids and low bids, and may include zero bids). For bid-
der i, let F h(v)κi denote the joint distribution of the n − 1 distributions of marginal
valuations for the ﬁrst unit from her competitors, κi =
∑
j∈N\i αj. Recall that given
Fmi (v) = F
m(v)αi , if αi ≥ αj, i, j ∈ N , then Fmi (v) likelihood ratio dominates Fmj (v),
m = h, l, v ∈ [0, v¯]. Thus, we know that for bidder i, F h(v)κi likelihood ratio dominates
F h(v)κi′ , if κi ≥ κi′ . Similarly, the joint distribution of the n−1 distributions of marginal
valuations for the second unit from her competitors F l(v)κi likelihood ratio dominates
F l(v)κi′ , if κi ≥ κi′ . Proposition 3.3 of Karlin and Rinott (1980) states that the joint den-
sity of two densities with likelihood ratio dominance relation also satisﬁes likelihood ratio
dominance. Thus, the joint distribution of F h(vm)κi and F l(vm)κi , vm ∈ [0, v¯], m = h, l,
also satisﬁes likelihood ratio dominance property given diﬀerent κi.
For bidder i, let Gi denote the distribution from which her 2(n−1) competing bids are
drawn. That is, Gi reﬂects i’s belief of possible competition from a set of ex ante asym-
metric rivals. Part (iii) of Lemma 2.1 implies that for each bidder her high bid is separable
from her low bid in the DPA; in addition, one’s two bids are also independent from the
bids from other bidders given the independent private values assumption. Therefore, the
2(n − 1) competing bids can be treated as independently drawn from Gi. Thus, I can
inverse each competing bid back to its corresponding original valuation distribution. By
Proposition 3.6 of Karlin and Rinott (1980) which shows that likelihood ratio dominance
is preserved after a monotone transformation, we know that Gi also satisﬁes likelihood
13 To my knowledge, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006) and Engelmann and Grimm (2009) are the two
studies that are close to my setting.
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ratio dominance property.
The corresponding likelihood ratio dominance property of the ﬁrst and second order
statistics of Gi, G
1
i and G
2
i , follows Proposition 3.2 of Karlin and Rinott (1980).
14 And
we know that likelihood ratio dominance implies reverse hazard rate dominance. 
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Part (i) φhi (v
h) ≤ φhj (vh), for all vh ∈ [0, v¯]. I will argue by contradiction. First, let
λh(φh) denote the inverse of the high bid function, such that λh(φh(vh)) = vh. Thus,
suppose that φhi (v
h) > φhj (v
h), for all vh ∈ [0, v¯], we should have λhi (φh) < λhj (φh).
Part (iii) of Lemma 2.2 implies that each bidder’s equilibrium high bids and low bids
can be separably derived from the respective ﬁrst-order conditions of Equation (2.2). That
is,
(vhi − φhi ) g2i (φhi ) = G2i (φhi ) and (vli − φli) g1i (φli) = G1i (φli)
which gives us
λhi (φ
h
i ) =
G2i (φ
h
i )
g2i (φ
h
i )
+ φhi , i ∈ N
for the equilibrium high bids. By Lemma 2.2, we know that if κj ≥ κi, then g
h
j (φ
h)
Ghj (φ
h)
≥
ghi (φ
h)
Ghi (φ
h)
, i, j ∈ N . Thus,
λhi (φ
h) = φh +
G2i (φ
h)
g2i (φ
h)
≥ G
2
j(φ
h)
g2j (φ
h)
+ φh = λhj (φ
h)
which is a contradiction.
Part (ii) φli(v
l) ≤ φlj(vl), for all vl ∈ [0, v¯]. The proof follows the same arguments for
part (i) with the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for the equilibrium low bids, and is
thus omitted. 
14 Here I follow the terminology and notation used in the auction literature, where the kth order
statistics is the kth highest observation in a sequence of samples. In statistics, however, the kth order
statistics is conventionally denoted as the kth smallest observation.
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2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Part (i) v∗i ≤ v∗j . First, by Proposition 2.1 and Equation (2.4), the threshold value for
nonzero bid v∗i , i ∈ N , should satisfy that for any ϕli > 0,
(vεi − ϕli)h1i (ϕli)− [H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)] < 0 and (v∗i − ϕli)h1i (ϕli)− [H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)] = 0
where vεi < v
∗
i . Rearranging the equation gives us
v∗i − ϕli =
1−Hi(ϕli)
hi(ϕli)
Next, recall that I denote by Hi the distribution from which the 2(n − 1) competing
bids for bidder i are drawn, by H1i the distribution of the ﬁrst (highest) order statistic,
and by H2i the distribution of the second (highest) order statistic. For a given nonzero
bid ϕli, we have
H1i (ϕ
l
i) = Hi(ϕ
l
i)
2(n−1), h1i (ϕ
l
i) = 2(n− 1)Hi(ϕli)2n−3hi(ϕli)
H2i (ϕ
l
i) = Hi(ϕ
l
i)
2(n−1) + 2(n− 1)Hi(ϕli)2n−3
(
1−Hi(ϕli)
)
Thus,
H2i (ϕ
l
i)−H1i (ϕli)
h1i (ϕ
l
i)
=
1−Hi(ϕli)
hi(ϕli)
By Lemma 2.3, we know that if κj ≥ κi, then hj(ϕ
l)
1−Hj(ϕl) ≤
hi(ϕ
l)
1−Hi(ϕl) , i, j ∈ N , ϕl > 0.
Thus,
v∗i = ϕ
l +
1−Hi(ϕl)
hi(ϕl)
≤ 1−Hj(ϕ
l)
hj(ϕl)
+ ϕl = v∗j
as I need.
Part (ii) ϕli(v
l) ≥ ϕlj(vl), for all vl ∈ [0, v¯]. Suppose by contradiction that ϕli(vl) <
ϕlj(v
l), for all vl ∈ [0, v¯]. By Proposition 2.1, for all ϕl > 0, we should have γ−1i (ϕl) >
γ−1j (ϕ
l), where γ−1m (ϕ
l), m = i, j, gives bidder m’s highest possible value for bidding below
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ϕl.
By Equation (2.4), we have the necessary ﬁrst-order condition for i’s optimal nonzero
low bids:
(γ−1i (ϕ
l
i)− ϕli)h1i (ϕli)− [H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)] = 0, i ∈ N
By Lemma 2.3, for all ϕl > 0, we have
γ−1i (ϕ
l) = ϕl +
1−Hi(ϕl)
hi(ϕl)
≤ 1−Hj(ϕ
l)
hj(ϕl)
+ ϕl = γ−1j (ϕ
l)
which is a contradiction. 
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3. EX ANTE COALITION IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS
Yun Liu∗
Abstract: Following Chapter 2, this paper further examines bidders’ ex ante collusion in-
centives in a one-short multi-unit auction game with incomplete information. I claim that
the uniform-price auction (UPA) is more vulnerable to collusion than the discriminatory-
price auction (DPA) in the sense that: 1) a bidder’s expected payoﬀ is always lower from
a larger coalition in a DPA; 2) for a class of all possible distributions, all coalitions are
core-stable in the UPA, whereas only the grand coalition has a nonempty core in the DPA.
At the policy level, these results oﬀer new insights into the regulation of anti-competitive
behavior in auction markets beyond the single-unit case.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C70; D44; L40
Keywords: multi-unit auctions, ex ante asymmetry, collusion, partition function game.
3.1 Introduction
Following Chapter 2, this paper further investigates bidders’ collusion incentives in the
uniform-price auction (UPA) and the discriminatory-price auction (DPA). I am interested
in which of the two auction mechanisms is more likely to boost collusion incentives by
investigating bidders’ ex ante formation of coalitions as bidding rings (Marshall et al.,
∗ Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 16A, DK-2000 Frederiks-
berg. Email: yliueco@gmail.com. I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Peter Bogetoft for his con-
tinuous support and guidance. I also thank Anette Boom for very helpful comments. Financial support
from the Center for research in the Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM), supported by the Danish
Council for Strategic Research, is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.
1994, Waehrer, 1999, Bajari, 2001, Kim and Che, 2004, Biran and Forges, 2011).1, 2 I
begin the analysis from imposing an a priori given coalition structure upon all bidders,
which partitions the set of bidders into separated groups before they receive their private
information.3 Next, assume a preauction knockout (McAfee and McMillan, 1992) is run
within each coalition before the grand auction. That is, only a representative bidder of
each coalition will participate in the grand auction and bid accordingly; the rest members
of each coalition submit irrelevant bids (or become inactive) in the grand auction.
Notice that even if bidders are ex ante symmetric, the presence of coalitions as bidding
rings essentially introduces asymmetries between bidders who are members of a ring and
those who are not, i.e., coalitions can be treated as prototypes of asymmetric bidders. As
I have shown in Chapter 2, analyzing equilibrium behavior in multi-unit auctions becomes
more problematic with asymmetric bidders. To circumvent possibly intractable technical
issues, I simplify the analysis by assuming bidders within each ring are committed to
truthfully communicate their value with other ring members.4 Each bidder, however, is
allowed to switch the initial partition subset she belongs to before knowing her private
value. Therefore, instead of analyzing bidders’ interim collusive strategies, this paper
investigates which auction mechanism is more vulnerable to collusions at the ex ante
stage by rewarding bidders for forming larger coalitions.
I ﬁrst contrast bidders’ collusion incentives from the perspective of the expected per-
member payoﬀ. That is, because all bidders are identical before receiving their private
values, each bidder will expect an equal portion of the total collusive gain from her
coalition. A bidder’s ex ante collusive decision (i.e., staying in or leaving her current
1 A bidding ring is composed of a group of bidders whom agree to collude together in order to gain
higher surplus by depressing competition in the grand auction.
2 An alternative approach is to analyze the interim formation of bidding rings, which focuses on an
ex ante given ring and explores optimal ways to organize the ring (Graham and Marshall, 1987, McAfee
and McMillan, 1992, Marshall and Marx, 2007, Hendricks et al., 2008).
3 Such assumption is justiﬁed in cases where the auction markets contain both incumbents (i.e., bidding
rings) and newcomers (i.e., individual bidders). For instance, in oil drilling (or mineral) rights auctions
where newcomers (or small companies) only have blurred valuations of the goods, while joining a con-
glomerate (i.e., a ring) may help them receive a clearer valuation or reduce redundant overhead costs (e.g.,
machine tools, administration costs, logistics). Also, in government procurements, incumbents may have
information advantages and consider to collude before the precise project speciﬁcations are published.
4 Marshall and Marx (2007) term such coalition mechanisms the bid submission mechanisms. Biran
and Forges (2011) further prove that the bid submission mechanism is ex ante incentive-compatible and
budget-balanced in a general Bayesian game with independent private values. As their setting clearly
include the multi-unit auction case, I expect a similar incentive-compatible ring mechanism also exist in
the setting as I discussed here.
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coalition before receiving her private value) will be based on the diﬀerence of her expected
per-member payoﬀ between the current coalition and feasible outside options. Theorem
3.1 (in Section 3.3.1) implies that the UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than the DPA
as each bidder’s expected payoﬀ is unanimously increasing (resp. decreasing) in the UPA
(resp. DPA) with the size of the coalition she belongs to. However, higher expected per-
member payoﬀs still cannot prevent bidders’ joint incentives to deviate from their current
coalitions. Proposition 3.1 (in Section 3.3.2) further shows that regardless of the sizes
of their current coalitions in the UPA, no subgroups of bidders would like to collectively
deviate from their current coalition once it is formed; by contrast, except for the grand
coalition, all bidders would prefer staying in a smaller coalition to their current current
coalitions in the DPA. These two results contribute to the literature by providing new
evidences in the choice between the UPA and the DPA apart from comparing their revenue
diﬀerence. It also oﬀers new insights into the regulation of anti-competitive behavior in
auction markets beyond the single-unit case.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
Consider an auction game with two indivisible and identical units of a good, and a set of
risk neutral and payoﬀ-maximizing bidders labeled by i, N = {1, . . . , n}, |N | ≥ 2.5 The
seller’s valuation to keep the unsold units is zero, and all bidders bid for both units on
sale. Each bidder has a privately known diminishing value pair vi = (v
h
i , v
l
i) for the two
successive units, vi ∈ [0, v¯] ⊂ R2+, vhi ≥ vli with probability one.
Denote F (vi) the joint distribution function of bidder i’s value pair vi. Let F be
atomless, the density f exists and is positive for all vi ∈ [0, v¯]2. Before knowing their
private values, bidders are partitioned into a set of distinct subsets according to S. All
bidders belong to one and only one subset, no subset is empty, and the union of all subsets
equals to N . Both the partition structure S and the distribution function F are common
knowledge.
Assume within each s ∈ S, bidders agree to share the information of their private
5 Throughout, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
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valuation, and only the bidder with the highest realized value will submit nonzero bids
in the grand auction. However, before knowing their private value, each bidder i ∈ s is
allowed to switch the partition subset s ∈ S she belongs to. We call a bidder with at least
one nonzero bid as an active bidder, and all others who bid zero on both units as inertia
bidders.6 Denote the bidding strategy of bidder i for the mth unit, m = h, l, as bmi (vi).
Each bidder i submits a pair of two bids bhi and b
l
i for the ﬁrst and second units of the
good respectively, bhi ≥ bli. Let c1 and c2 be the highest and second highest competing bids
from i’s rivals outside her own partition subset s respectively. The equilibrium concept
used in this paper is the usual (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Section 3.2.2 introduces the uniform-price auction (UPA) and the discriminatory-price
auction (DPA), which are exclusively discussed in this paper. The setting of these two
auction formats is exactly the same as in Chapter 2.
3.2.2 Two Formats of Multi-unit Auction
In a DPA, bidders pay the price they bid for each of the units they win. Write the bid bm
in the DPA as φm, m = h, l. When bidder i submits a pair of bids (φhi , φ
l
i), her expected
payoﬀ is
πi(φ
h
i , φ
l
i; v
h
i , v
l
i) = (v
h
i − φhi )G2i (φhi ) + (vli − φli)G1i (φli) (3.1)
where G1i is the marginal distribution of the highest competing bid c
1, and G2i is the
marginal distribution of the second highest competing bid c2. Thus, G2i (φ
h
i ) represents
the probability that bidder i wins the ﬁrst unit when her high bid φhi is higher than the
second highest competing bid c2; she wins the second unit when her low bid φli is higher
than the highest competing bid c1 with probability G1i (φ
l
i).
In a UPA, all winning bidders pay the same price for each unit they win, where the
market-clearing price is set at the highest losing bid. Write ϕhi and ϕ
l
i as i’s bid for the
ﬁrst unit and second unit of the good respectively. Similar to the case of the DPA, let
c1 and c2 be the highest and second highest bids from all of i’s rivals. Denote by H1i be
6 Note that a bidder is always the active bidder of her subset, if she belongs to a singleton subset (i.e.,
|s| = 1).
78
the marginal distribution of the highest competing bid c1 with density h1i , and by H
2
i the
marginal distribution of c2 with density h2i . Given the strategies of all other bidders, the
corresponding expected payoﬀ of a bidder with value (vhi , v
l
i) and bids (ϕ
h
i , ϕ
l
i) is
πi(ϕ
h
i , ϕ
l
i; v
h
i , v
l
i) = (v
h
i + v
l
i)H
1
i (ϕ
l
i)− 2
∫ ϕli
0
c1h1i (c
1) dc1
+ vhi [H
2
i (ϕ
h
i )−H1i (ϕli)]− ϕli[H2i (ϕli)−H1i (ϕli)]−
∫ ϕhi
ϕli
c2h2i (c
2) dc2
(3.2)
where the ﬁrst line describes i’s expected payoﬀ when she wins both units, i.e., i’s
low bid ϕli defeats all competing bids and win two units with probability H
1
i (ϕ
l
i). The
second line is the case in which she wins one unit with probability H2i (ϕ
h
i ) − H1i (ϕli).
H2i (ϕ
l
i)−H1i (ϕli) represents the probability that the market-clearing price is ϕli.
3.3 Results
I ﬁrst summarize and rephrase the multi-unit auction game through the following timeline.
• Time 0: Market is set up with: (i) two indivisible and identical units of a good; (ii) a
non-strategic seller and n ≥ 2 risk neutral and payoﬀ-maximizing bidders; (iii) bidders
have decreasing marginal value for the two units on sale; (iii) each bidder i has privately
known diminishing marginal values vi = (v
h
i , v
l
i) for the two successive units, which are
drawn from a commonly known distribution F (vi), i ∈ N .
• Time 1: Before receiving their private values v for the good, a partition structure S
is imposed on the set of bidders. Each partition subset contains |s| bidders, s ∈ S.
Bidders are allowed to switch the partition subsets they belong to before receiving their
private values. Only the initial S is publicly observable.
• Time 2: After knowing v, bidders within each partition subset are committed to form
a coalition. The coalition acts as a bidding ring. That is, for each ring, a representative
bidder participates in the grand auction (organized by the seller) and bids according to
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the highest valuation pair reported within the ring; all the other ring members submit
irrelevant bids. Assume no strategic behavior within each ring.
• Time 3: The seller collects all bids and chooses the highest two bids for assignment.
Payments are decided by the chosen auction mechanism (UPA or DPA).
Because both the initial partition S and the value distribution F are common knowl-
edge, for a coalition s ∈ S, F (v)s essentially reﬂects the belief of competing bidders
outside s.7 Thus, even if bidders were ex ante symmetric within each coalition, the pres-
ence of coalitions of diﬀerent sizes virtually introduces asymmetries among bidders. In
addition to complicating bidders’ equilibrium behavior (as I have shown in Chapter 2),
a higher degree of market asymmetries will inevitably reduce the expected revenue to
the seller. From the perspective of the seller, exacerbating market asymmetries through
forming larger coalitions should nevertheless be avoided.
In this paper, I evaluate the vulnerability to collusion from the perspective of the
expected per-member payoﬀ (in Section 3.3.1), and the core stability (in Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Expected Per-member Payoﬀ
From the perspective of bidder i, her ex ante expected payoﬀ from staying in coalition s
is
ui =
1
|s|
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
πs(b
h
s , b
l
s; v
h
s , v
l
s) dFs(v
h
s , v
l
s) (3.3)
where πs(b
h
s , b
l
s; v
h
s , v
l
s) is the expected payoﬀ of coalition s at the ex ante stage when
the representative bidder of coalition s has value (vhs , v
l
s) with the corresponding pair of
bids (bhs , b
l
s), and all other representative bidders of their respective coalitions follow their
equilibrium bidding strategies. ui is the expected per-member payoﬀ, which determines i’s
decision to remain with or leave her current coalition group. Denote uUPAi and u
UPA
j the
expected per-member payoﬀ in a UPA and a DPA respectively.
Theorem 3.1: Let S be a partition of a set of ex ante symmetric bidders N , |N | ≥ 2, i ∈ s
and j ∈ s′, s, s′ ∈ S. If |s| ≥ |s′|, then uDPAi ≤ uDPAj and uUPAi ≥ uUPAj .
7 With a slight abuse of notation, I use s to represent both a coalition set and its cardinality if no
confusion arises.
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Proof. See Appendix 3.5.1. 
Theorem 3.1 says that the expected per-member payoﬀ is higher (resp. lower) when
a bidder stays in a larger (resp. smaller) bidding coalition under the UPA (resp. DPA).
In other words, the UPA encourages bidders to expand the size of their coalitions by
absorbing those who belong to other smaller groups for the purpose of reducing the level
of market competition. The DPA, however, reveals a diﬀerent collusion mechanism in
which bidders prefer to stay in a smaller coalition group rather than join a larger one.
For example, in an auction market with three identical bidders, i.e., singleton coalitions,
any two of the three bidders will intend to merge as a new coalition in a UPA, which
gives them a higher level of ex ante expected payoﬀ; in addition, the remaining singleton
bidder also would like to join the larger coalition. By contrast, all three bidders prefer
maintaining their current status to forming a larger coalition in a DPA. Therefore, the
higher per-member payoﬀs from a smaller coalition in the DPA may further restrain the
anti-competitive behavior in auction markets with heterogeneous participants.
In the next section, I further investigate bidders’ joint incentives to deviate from their
current coalitions.
3.3.2 Core Stability
In the language of cooperative games, my setting can be considered as a partition form
game (Thrall and Lucas, 1963), which reﬂects the ex ante commitments of bidding coali-
tions given the underlying partition structure. Bidders are committed to sharing their
private valuation with other members in the same coalition, submitting bids according to
their collusive agreements and receiving compensations afterwards (Marshall and Marx,
2007, Biran and Forges, 2011).
I ﬁrst extend my notation of the group expected payoﬀ π to represent the expected
payoﬀ of the coalition s in a given partition S when all coalitions behave according to the
equilibrium σ(S) (Ray and Vohra, 1997),8
πσ(s;S) = E
[∑
i∈s
πi
(
(v˜i, σ(S)(v˜)
)]
8 In the case of multiple equilibria, I ﬁx a mapping σ associating a coalitional equilibrium σ(S) with
every S, which is plausible in the context of auctions in which bidders are allowed to select their strategies.
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where πi is the share of i’s coalitional gains given v˜i, a random realization of (v
h
i , v
l
i),
and the associated coalitional equilibrium σ(S)(v˜), v˜ = (v˜k)k∈S . Notice that for the two
extreme cases, (i) when |s| = 1, i.e., the singleton coalition, πσ(i;S) is the expected payoﬀ
bidder i can obtain independently at the partition S; (ii) when |s| = |N |, i.e., the grand
coalition, πσ(N ;S) gives the Pareto optimal payoﬀ of the S.
Deﬁne the characteristic function of a coalition s as
vsσ(r) = min
sc∈P(s\r)
πσ
(
r; {r, sc, (s′)s′∈S\s}
)
, r ⊆ s
where P(s\r) is the set of all possible partitions of the remaining members in s without
r. Therefore, vsσ(r) reﬂects the most pessimistic expectation of the subgroup r once they
deviate from s.9 A coalition s is core-stable (Biran and Forges, 2011), if
∑
i∈r
πσ(i;S) ≥ vsσ(r), ∀ r ⊆ s
That is, no subgroup r ⊆ s has the incentive to leave s together if no outside option
would give r a higher possible coalitional gain than the sum of payoﬀs they can obtain
from s independently.
Proposition 3.1: In an auction market satisfying the assumptions of Section 3.2, all coali-
tions are core-stable in the UPA, while only the grand coalition is core-stable in the DPA.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.2. 
Proposition 3.1 further contrasts the vulnerability to collusion between the UPA and
the DPA from a cooperative game perspective. It indicates that for any given coalition
structure in the UPA, no subgroup members have incentives to jointly deviate from their
current coalitions. By contrast, in the DPA, only the grand coalition which includes all
bidders is able to provide a higher payoﬀ to any possible subgroup members over their
outside options. As the grand coalition is rarely observed in practice,10 Proposition 3.1
9 Here I implicitly assume the remaining members in s still form the complementary coalition and
behave according to their corresponding equilibrium strategy in σ(S), even if the subgroup bidders in r
secede.
10 Some possible explanations include the problem of interim commitment, the communication cost
among coalition members, and the penalty and deterrence from antitrust regulations and competition
laws.
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further supports my argument that the UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than the
DPA in auction markets with private information.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper considers bidders’ collusion incentives in a one-short multi-unit auction game
with incomplete information.11 I argue that the UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than
the DPA in term of the expected per-member payoﬀ and the core-stability at the ex ante
stage. Even though I only consider a simpliﬁed and highly stylized market environment,
these observations still oﬀer some nontrivial insights to the competition authorities when
explicit collusion is a major concern.
3.5 Appendix for Chapter 3
3.5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
(i) uDPAi ≤ uDPAj . By part (iii) of Lemma 2.1 in Chapter 2, I know that all bids can be
made as separate bids in the DPA. Together with Equation (3.1) I ﬁrst rewrite Equation
(3.3) for coalition s in a DPA as
uDPAi =
1
s
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
πs(φ
h
s , φ
l
s; v
h, vl) dF (vh, vl)s
=
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls(v))G1s(φls(v))F l(v)s−1f (v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v))G2s(φhs (v))F h(v)s−1f (v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
where part (a) is the expected per-member payoﬀ when a representative bidder in s
wins the second unit when her low bid beats the highest competing bidder outside s, and
11 Another strand of literature studies the case of tacit collusions (i.e., no monetary compensation
within a coalition) in inﬁnitely repeated auctions with complete information. See, for example, Fabra
(2003).
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part (b) is a representative bidder’s expected payoﬀ when she wins the ﬁrst unit with her
high bid. I can write part (a) as
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls(v))G1s(φls(v))F l(v)s−1f (v) dv
=
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls(v))
⎡
⎣ ∏
k∈S\s,s′
phk(φ
l
s(v))F
h(λhs′(φ
l
s(v)))
s′
⎤
⎦F l(v)s−1f (v) dv (3.4)
where phk(φ
l
s(v)) is the probability that the high bid of a competing representative
bidder outside s is below the low bid of the representative bidder of s; and λhs′ denotes
the inverse of φhs′ , such that λ
h
s′(φ
h
s′(v)) = v.
For part (b), the event that G2s(φ
h
s ) involves two components: φ
h
s beats the highest
competing bid outside s (which is the same in part (a)), and φhs is lower than one competing
bid but higher than all the rest competing bids. Without loss of generality, let a bidder
k′ not in s′ win the second unit.12 Part (b) can be written as
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v)) A =
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v)) A1 +
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v)) A2 (3.5)
with
A = G2s(φ
h
s (v))F
h(v)s−1f (v) dv
A1 =
⎡
⎣ ∏
k∈S\s,s′
phk(φ
h
s (v))F
h(λhs′(φ
h
s (v)))
s′
⎤
⎦F h(v)s−1f (v) dv
12 If there are more than two coalition groups, we can always choose the comparison group s′ who does
not win the second unit. However, for markets with only two coalitions, Equation (3.5) becomes
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v))G2s(φhs (v))F h(v)s−1f (v) =
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v))F h(λhs′(φhs (v)))s
′
F h(v)s−1f (v) dv
+
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs (v))
[
F l(λls′(φ
h
s (v)))
s′(1− F h(λhs′(φhs (v)))s
′
)
]
F h(v)s−1f (v) dv
where λls′ denotes the inverse of φ
l
s′ . All the following arguments are still valid, I thus omit the details.
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A2 =
⎡
⎣ ∑
k′∈S\s,s′
∏
k∈S\s, s′, k′
phk(φ
h
s (v))
(
1− phk′(φhs (v))
)
F h(λhs′(φ
h
s (v)))
s′
⎤
⎦ F h(v)s−1f (v) dv
As I analyze bidders’ incentives to derivate from her current coalition in term of the ex
ante expected per-member payoﬀ in UPA, I need to compare the payoﬀ diﬀerence between
a bidder i if she is in coalition s with another bidder j in s′. To make the comparison
more clearly, I also write down the expected per-member payoﬀ of coalition s′
uDPAj =
1
s′
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
πs′(φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′ ; v
h, vl) dF (vh, vl)s
′
=
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls′(v))G1s′(φls′(v))F l(v)s
′−1f (v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a′)
+
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs′(v))G2s′(φhs′(v))F h(v)s
′−1f (v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b′)
where part (a′) as
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls′(v))G1s′(φls′(v))F l(v)s
′−1f (v) dv
=
∫ v¯
0
(v − φls′(v))
⎡
⎣ ∏
k∈S\s,s′
phk(φ
l
s′(v))F
h(λhs (φ
l
s′(v)))
s
⎤
⎦F l(v)s′−1f (v) dv (3.6)
and part (b′) as
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs′(v)) B =
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs′(v)) B1 + +
∫ v¯
0
(v − φhs′(v)) B2 (3.7)
with
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B = G2s′(φ
h
s′(v))F
h(v)s
′−1f (v) dv
B1 =
⎡
⎣ ∏
k∈S\s,s′
phk(φ
h
s′(v))F
h(λhs (φ
h
s′(v)))
s
⎤
⎦F h(v)s′−1f (v) dv
B2 =
⎡
⎣ ∑
k′∈S\s,s′
∏
k∈S\s, s′, k′
phk(φ
h
s′(v))
(
1− phk′(φhs′(v))
)
F h(λhs (φ
h
s′(v)))
s
⎤
⎦F h(v)s′−1f (v) dv
In order to show uDPAj ≥ uDPAi , I can validate the following conditions
uDPAj ≡ uDPAj
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′)
) ≥ uDPAj ((φhs , φls), (φhs , φls))
≥ uDPAi
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s , φ
l
s)
)
≥ uDPAi
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′)
) ≡ uDPAi
With a slight abuse of notation, I use uDPAj
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′)
)
to represent bidder j’s
expected payoﬀ when bidder i in coalition s bids according to the ﬁrst component (φhs , φ
l
s)
and bidder j in coalition s′ bids according to the second component (φhs′ , φ
l
s′). Similar inter-
pretations apply to uDPAj
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s , φ
l
s)
)
, uDPAi
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s , φ
l
s)
)
and uDPAi
(
(φhs , φ
l
s), (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′)
)
respectively. Thus, when a bidder in s consider moving to a diﬀerent coalition, she as-
sumes all the other bidders outside her current and target group follow their current
equilibrium strategies, and only considers the eﬀect of changing bids in her own coalition
group s and the target group s′.
The ﬁrst inequality holds is because (φhs′ , φ
l
s′) is the equilibrium strategy for a repre-
sentative bidder j in s′, which should be at least as good as some other bidding strategies.
The second inequality comes from the fact that if the two representative bidders from s
and s′ submit the identical pair of bids, the expected per-member payoﬀ is higher in a
coalition with fewer members.
For the last inequality, ﬁrst replace φhs′ with φ
h
s (i.e., change the inverse bid function
λhs′(φ
h) to λhs (φ
h)) in Equation (3.4) and (3.5). We can see that the only diﬀerence in
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Equation (3.4) after substituting (φhs′ , φ
l
s′) with (φ
h
s , φ
l
s) comes from F
h(λhs (φ
l
s(v))). Recall
φli(v
h, vl) ≤ φlj(vh, vl) from Theorem 2.1, with i ∈ s and j ∈ s′, we have F h(λhs (φls(v))) ≥
F h(λhs′(φ
l
s(v))), for all v ∈ [0, v¯]. Thus, i’s expected payoﬀ from part (a) is higher when j
bids according to (φhs , φ
l
s) instead of (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′). Apply similar arguments to Equation (3.5),
we can see that i’s expected payoﬀ from part (b) is also higher when j bids according to
(φhs , φ
l
s) instead of (φ
h
s′ , φ
l
s′), which is given by F
h(v) ≥ F h(λhs′(φhs (v))), for all v ∈ [0, v¯].
(ii) uUPAi ≥ uUPAj . First, substitute vhi for ϕhi and simplify Equation (3.2) after inte-
gration by parts as
πs(ϕ
l
s; v
h
s , v
l
s) = (v
l
s − ϕls)H1s (ϕls) + 2
∫ ϕls
0
H1s (c
1) dc1 +
∫ vhs
ϕls
H2s (c
2) dc2 (3.8)
where πs is the expected payoﬀ of coalition s. As in Section 3.3, I abuse notation by
using s to represent both a set of bidders and its cardinality, if no confusion arises. By
Proposition 2.1 of Chapter 2, we know there is threshold value v∗ of nonzero low bid.
Substitute Equation (3.8) into Equation (3.3) and organize, we can write the expected
per-member payoﬀ in a UPA as
uUPAi =
1
|s|
∫ v∗
0
dF l(y)s
∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
∫ x
0
H2s (c) dc+
1
|s|
∫ v¯
v∗
dF l(y)s
∫ v¯
y
πs(ϕ
l
s; x, y) dF
h(x)s
=
∫ v∗
0
[∫ v¯
y
F h(x)s−1f (x)
∫ x
0
H2s (c) dc dx
]
dF l(y)s
+
∫ v¯
v∗
F l(y)s−1f (y)
∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
[
(y − ϕls(y))H1s (ϕls(y)) + 2
∫ ϕls(y)
0
H1s (c) dc
]
dy
+
∫ v¯
v∗
F l(y)s−1f (y)
[∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
∫ x
ϕls(y)
H2s (c) dc
]
dy (3.9)
where the second line is the case when vls is lower than v
∗; that is, the coalition s wins
one unit when vhs is greater than the second highest competing bid c
2. c2 is distributed
according to H2s . F
h(v)s and F l(v)s are the distributions of marginal valuations for the
ﬁrst unit and the second unit of the representative bidder of s. The last two lines represent
the expected per-member payoﬀ when vls is greater than the threshold of nonzero low bid.
Similar to the DPA case, I compare the payoﬀ diﬀerence between a bidder i in the coalition
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s and a bidder j in s′. Write down the corresponding expression for uUPAj
uUPAj =
1
|s′|
∫ v∗∗
0
dF l(y)s
′
∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
′
∫ x
0
H2s′(c) dc+
1
|s′|
∫ v¯
v∗
dF l(y)s
′
∫ v¯
y
πs′(ϕ
l
s′ ; x, y) dF
h(x)s
′
=
∫ v∗∗
0
[∫ v¯
y
F h(x)s
′−1f (x)
∫ x
0
H2s′(c) dc dx
]
dF l(y)s
′
+
∫ v¯
v∗∗
F l(y)s
′−1f (y)
∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
′
[
(y − ϕls′(y))H1s′(ϕls′(y)) + 2
∫ ϕl
s′ (y)
0
H1s′(c) dc
]
dy
+
∫ v¯
v∗∗
F l(y)s
′−1f (y)
[∫ v¯
y
dF h(x)s
′
∫ x
ϕl
s′ (y)
H2s′(c) dc
]
dy (3.10)
where v∗∗ is the optimal threshold of nonzero low bid for coalition s′. Extend my
notation to allow uUPA(ϕlb, a; b), a = v
∗, v∗∗ and b = s, s′, which represents the change of
u with the nonzero bid threshold (v∗ and v∗∗) and the coalition group (s and s′). To show
ui(ϕ
l
s, v
∗; s)UPA ≥ uUPAj (ϕls′ , v∗∗; s′), when |s| ≥ |s′|, i ∈ s and j ∈ s′, we can validate the
following conditions
uUPAi (ϕ
l
s, v
∗; s) ≥ uUPAi (ϕls′ , v∗∗; s) ≥ uUPAj (ϕls′ , v∗∗; s′)
The ﬁrst inequality follows because ϕls is the equilibrium bid for the representative
bidder in s with (vh, vl), and v∗ is the corresponding optimal threshold of nonzero low
bid. ϕls and v
∗ should be at least as good as bidding some alternative ϕls′ and v
∗∗ in
coalition s. For the second inequality, since given a ﬁx number of bidders N a larger s
is equivalent to a smaller κs, by Lemma 2.3 of Chapter 2 I know that if |s| ≥ |s′| then
H1s′ (resp. H
2
s′) dominates H
1
s (resp. H
2
s ) in terms of the hazard rate, which implies
the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance Hms (x) ≥ Hms′ (x), m = 1, 2. Replace ϕls and v∗ in
Equation (3.9) with ϕls′ and v
∗∗ respectively. Comparing each item in Equation (3.9) with
its corresponding item in Equation (3.10), I can see that bidding strategy ϕls′(v
h, vl) will
generate higher expected payoﬀ given a smaller number of competing bidders for each
vh, vl ∈ [0, v¯], which validates the second inequality. 
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3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(UPA:) Since all bidders are ex ante symmetric within each coalition, to ensure that
no subgroup would like to leave its current coalition, I only need to verify that πσ(s;S)|s| ≥
πσ(s′;S)
|s′| , for all s
′ ⊆ s. Recall Theorem 3.1, I have uUPAi = πσ(s;S)|s| , i ∈ s, and uUPAi ≥ uUPAj ,
i ∈ s, j ∈ s′ and s′ ⊆ s. The grand coalition case simply follows when setting |s| = |N |.
(DPA:) Also from Theorem 3.1, I have uDPAi ≤ uDPAj , i ∈ s, j ∈ s′ and s′ ⊆ s, which
completes the statement that all partial coalitions are instable in the DPA. To show the
grand coalition is core-stable, I need to verify that πσ(N ;S)|N | ≥ πσ(s;S)|s| , for all s ⊆ N . First,
because the grand coalition always oﬀers the Pareto optimal payoﬀ, I know that
πσ(N ;S) ≥ πσ(s;S) +
∑
i∈N\s
πσ(i;S)
Also, Theorem 3.1 implies that
πσ(i;S) ≥ πσ(s;S)|s|
where πσ(i;S) is i’s payoﬀ when forming the singleton coalition and 2 ≤ |s| ≤ |N |.
Combing the above two inequalities validates πσ(N ;S)|N | ≥ πσ(s;S)|s| as I need. 
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4. STABLE COALITION IN MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS
Yun Liu∗
Abstract: This paper illustrates the coalition formation processes in the Ausubel’s clinch-
ing auction. Compared with the commonly used simultaneous sealed-bid auctions in mar-
kets with multiple objectives (e.g., the uniform-price auction and the discriminatory-price
auction), the clinching auction oﬀers an open ascending-bid alternative with a clear im-
provement in allocation eﬃciency while maintaining simplicity to perform in practice. I
ﬁrst show how vulnerable to collusion the clinching auction is, in the sense that it always
has a non-empty core. I further argue that a non-bossiness condition is crucial to such
vulnerability, and brieﬂy discuss the intrinsic tension among eﬃciency, truthfulness, and
non-bossiness in auction mechanisms.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C78; I20
Keywords: multi-item auction, group strategy-proofness, core, non-bossiness.
4.1 Introduction
Market design is an emerging ﬁeld in the past few decades with wide practical successes.1
One key criterion of a good design is that players should have incentive to reveal their
∗ Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 16A, DK-2000 Frederiks-
berg. Email: yliueco@gmail.com. I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Peter Bogetoft for his continu-
ous support and guidance. I thank Anette Boom, Gagan Ghosh and Lars Peter Østerdal for very helpful
comments. Financial support from the Center for research in the Foundations of Electronic Markets
(CFEM), supported by the Danish Council for Strategic Research, is gratefully acknowledged. All errors
are mine.
1 For example, governments use open market auctions to allocate radio spectrum, timber, electricity,
and natural gas involving hundreds of billions of dollars worldwide (Milgrom, 2004). In matching, notice-
able applications include entry level labor market, house allocation, school choice, organ donation and
exchange among others (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Roth, 2008).
true valuations. An assumption made in most literature in the area of eﬃcient mechanism
design, dating back to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, is that selﬁsh players
do not collude with each other. However, even if a cautious design can ensure truthful
bidding(s) from each individual bidder, it may still be ineﬀective in preventing their
coalitional behavior, i.e., several players may agree to misreport their valuations in a
coordinated way and split the gains from such manipulation.
Although the existing literature of collusion in auctions (and other pricing mecha-
nisms) is far from rare, to my knowledge, not many well-established results have directly
addressed coalitional behavior in auctions from the cooperative game aspect.2 The pri-
mary motive of this paper is to explore whether colluders can cooperatively facilitate
a feasible revenue division scheme among themselves in auction markets with multiple
objects.3
At the current stage, I do not intend to propose a new multi-item auction format,
but rather establishing my analysis based on the clinching auction (Ausubel, 2004) which
essentially replicates the allocation of VCG mechanism in an ascending auction format
with a relatively simple payment rule. I consider an auction game with multiple objects,
and bidders with complete information. Bidders may collude with each other and jointly
share the coalitional gains; in addition, transfers are not forbidden among colluders.4 I
employ the conventional core notion as the solution concept, which characterizes the set
of feasible division of coalition gains among the colluders.
My ﬁrst result (Proposition 4.1) shows that the core is always non-empty in this game,
i.e., all colluders perceive higher returns from staying in their current coalitions compared
to all other alternatives). Under a mild super-additive assumption of the coalition gains,
the grand coalition containing all bidders will eventually be formed in equilibrium regard-
less of the former divisions of sub-coalition groups.5 Thus, although the clinching auction
2 Some exceptions include Ausubel and Baranov (2010), Bachrach (2010), Biran and Forges (2011),
among others.
3 Notice that diﬀerent from the multi-unit auctions with more than one unit of a homogeneous good
on sale, the items are not necessarily identical to each other in multi-item auctions. Some prominent
real-life examples include selling advertisement slots for search engines, FCC spectrum auctions, among
others.
4 Although at ﬁrst glance it may seem as a mere technical simpliﬁcation by allowing transfers among
colluders, detecting the concealed reciprocal agreements is nevertheless diﬃcult in practice. Also, for
those bidders who are unlikely to win in the grand auction, participating in a pre-auction collusion
scheme will at least grant them the opportunity to receive compensation from the coalition.
5 Super-additivity implies that the joint gain of two merged coalition groups should be no less than
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guarantees eﬃcient allocations as the VCG auction, caution should be exercised when
applying it in markets where secret coalitions are highly suspicious.6
I then explore the source of collusive incentives in auction games. A common col-
lusion strategy is to cooperate reports among colluders (as I have discussed in Chap-
ter 3), which will clearly mitigate the intensity of rivalry among bidders and eventually
shift more surplus towards the side of bidders. The seller apparently wants to detect
and deter possible coalitions through such joint manipulations of reports. Analogous to
the strategy-proofness condition which requires truthful reporting from each individual
bidder, I introduce the group strategy-proofness condition to address bidders’ joint in-
centives of misreporting.7 Observation 1 indicates that an auction mechanism is group
strategy-proof, if and only if it is non-bossy (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981).8 One
major challenge regarding the design of auction mechanisms satisfying the group strategy-
proofness condition is the large number of extra incentive-compatibility constraints after
introducing it into the seller’s optimization problem.9 Given the relatively simple expres-
sion of the non-bossiness condition, Observation 1 may point out an alternative approach
regarding the design of collusion-proofness mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms satisfying the
group strategy-proofness condition) (Che and Kim, 2006, Pavlov, 2008, Che and Kim,
2009). Last, I brieﬂy discuss the intrinsic tension among eﬃciency, truthfulness, and
non-bossiness in auction mechanisms (Observation 2).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model and illustrates
the Ausubel’s clinching auction. Section 4.3 studies bidders’ collusion incentives in the
clinching auction. Section 4.4 further investigates the source of such vulnerability to
collusion. Section 4.5 concludes the paper. Appendix 4.6 states the proof of Proposition
the sum of each coalition group, i.e., for two coalition groups A and B, v(A+B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
6 Also, as the clinching auction always generates the same allocation outcome as the VCG auction
does in a given market, it is plausible to suspect that other variants of the VCG mechanism in auction
markets may also be vulnerable to similar coalitional schemes (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006).
7 An auction mechanism is group strategy-proof if no subgroup of bidders can jointly manipulate their
reports so that all of them weakly beneﬁt from this manipulation, while at least one bidder in the subgroup
strictly beneﬁts.
8 The non-bossiness condition requires if a change of one’s reported preference does not aﬀect her own
utility (i.e., the allocation and her payment to the mechanism), such change should not aﬀect others’
utilities.
9 For example, in an auction game with n ex ante symmetric bidders, the conventional strategy-
proofness condition only requires one incentive-compatibility constraint. However, satisfying the group
strategy-proofness condition will demand (n − 1) ex ante incentive-compatibility constraints, and 2n−1
constraints at the interim stage.
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4.1.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions
Consider a multi-item auction markets with X heterogeneous items and |N | risk neutral
and payoﬀ-maximizing bidders. N = {1, . . . , n} and N−i is the set of all the players except
i. The seller’s valuation to keep unsold items is zero, and he needs to choose an auction
mechanism for allocating the items and collecting payments from bidders. Let x be the
vector of allocations which speciﬁes the amount of items each bidder gets, and p be the
vector of bidders’ payments, Each bidder i has a type θi representing the vector of her
preferences over X. She can choose to report θ′i = si(θi), where si represents her strategy.
Denote ui(xi, θi) as bidder i’s valuation over her own type θi and her allocation outcome xi
chosen by the mechanism. Bidders have quasi-linear utility functions μi = ui(xi, θi)− pi,
where pi is her payment to the mechanism if she receives xi amount of the items. Denote
the marginal value of the l’th item to player i as mi(l) = ui(l) − ui(l − 1). Assume the
marginal value of each additional items is non-increasing, mi(l) ≥ mi(l + 1).
A cooperative game (N, v) is composed of a set of players N , and a characteristic
function v : 2N → R+ that indicates the total payoﬀ these players can achieve together.
A cooperative game is monotonic if for all coalitions C ′ ⊆ C, v(C ′) ≤ v(C), and is convex
when for all coalitions C ′, C ⊆ N I have v(C ′) + v(C) ≤ v(C ′ ∪ C) + v(C ′ ∩ C). The
characteristic function only gives the total gains a coalition can achieve, but it does not
deﬁne how these gains are distributed among its members. An imputation (η1, . . . ηi)i∈C
is a division of coalition gains among |C| colluders, where ηi is the payoﬀ of i, and
η(C) =
∑
i∈C ηi. The core of a cooperative game (N, v) is a set of payoﬀ vectors:
Core(N, v) =
{
η ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
ηi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
ηi ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
In words, the core is the set of feasible imputations (i.e.,
∑
i∈N ηi = v(N)) which
promises no coalition has a joint payoﬀ (i.e., v(S)) greater than the sum of its members’
payoﬀs (i.e.,
∑
i∈S ηi).
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4.2.2 The Ausubel’s mult-item clinching auction
In the Ausubel’s clinching auction, a price parameter gradually increases, and bidders
keep decreasing their (discrete) demands for items with the price parameter. For bidder
i, whenever the combined market demand from other bidders is strictly below the market
supply, she can “clinch” one item at the current price. Therefore, each bidder’s payment
is the sum of the price parameters for each item she clinched throughout the auction
process.
Formally, the auction keeps: i) an item counter for the number of items xi bidder
i has clinched, and a payment counter for these items pi; ii) a global price parameter
β; and iii) a global counter for the number of remaining items r, r = X −∑i∈N xi. β
keeps ascending as long as the total market demand
∑
i∈N Di(β) is larger than the total
remaining supply r. If at some β the remaining supply r is larger than the residual
demand D−i(β), D−i(β) =
∑
j∈N\iDj, the mechanism allocates z item(s) to bidder i at
price β, z = r −D−i(β), and records the current price parameter β times the number of
clinched item(s) z to i’s payment counter pi. The mechanisms updates its parameters as
follows: xi ← xi + z, pi ← pi + β · z, r ← r− z. The clinching auction mechanism can be
summarized as the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1. Ausubel’s clinching auction
(1) Initialization: xi ← 0, pi ← 0, β ← 0, r ← X.
(2) When
∑
i∈N Di(β) > r:
(a) If there exists a bidder i such that D−i(β) < r, then allocate z = r−D−i(β) items
to bidder i with payment β · z. Update all running variables as xi ← xi+ z, pi ←
pi + β · z, r ← r − z, and repeat.
(b) Otherwise, increase β, recompute the demands in Step (2.a.), and repeat.
(3) When
∑
i∈N Di(β) = r, allocate to each bidder his demand at β, and terminate.
After the termination, if xi > 0, bidders pay the mechanism according to the their
payment counters pi.
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4.3 Vulnerability to Collusion
The Ausubel’s design of multi-item auctions essentially replicates the allocations of the
VCG mechanism in an ascending auction format, which guarantees truthful reports from
each individual bidder, but with a relatively simple payment rule. However, like the VCG
auction mechanism, it also suﬀers bidders’ joint manipulations of their reports. I use
the following example to illustrate how bidders’ coalitional strategies can trim down the
seller’s revenue:
Example 4.1: (U.S. Nationwide Narrowband Auction) There are 5 identical licenses auc-
tioned among 5 bidders. Each bidder is limited to bidding at most 3 licenses. Their
preferences are:
license
utility
a b c d e
ﬁrst 123 75 125 85 45
second 113 5 125 65 25
third 103 3 49 7 5
(Case 1: no collusion) When no collusion is facilitated, the ﬁrst license is “clinched”
when the global price parameter β raises to 65, where the residual demand for bidder a is
D−a(65) = 4. Similarly, when b = 75, D−a(75) = 3, and D−c(75) = 4. That is, bidder a
has clinched two items at price 65 and 75 respectively; meanwhile bidder c also clinches 1
units at 75. Continue the same fashion, when b = 85, the market clears (
∑
i∈N Di(β) = r),
bidder a and c win the rest two units and pay 85 for each. The total payment for a is
65+75+85, and 75+85 for c.
price
demand
a b c d e
65 3 1 2 1 0
75 3 0 2 1 0
85 3 0 2 0 0
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(Case 2: a partial collusion) Consider a partial coalition with bidder a, c and d, in
which bidder a and c still report their true valuations as in Case 1, and bidder d agrees
to report θ′d = (65, 65, 7).
license
utility
a b c d e
ﬁrst 123 75 125 65 45
second 113 5 125 65 25
third 103 3 49 7 5
The allocations are the same as in Case 1, where bidder a receives three licenses and
bidder c gets the other two licenses. However, the mechanism collects fewer payments
from bidder a and bidder c compared with the situation when there is no collusion. That
is, bidder a pays 65 + 65 + 75 (v.s. 65 + 65 + 85 in Case 1), and bidder c pays 75 + 75
(v.s. 75 + 85 in Case 1).
price
demand
a b c d e
65 3 1 2 1 0
75 3 0 2 0 0
As monetary compensation is not forbidden (or simply cannot be observed) within
the coalition, bidder d should be at least weakly better-oﬀ from manipulating her reports,
even though she still does not win any item.
(Case 3: the grand coalition) Since bidder e does not win in any case, applying
similar arguments as in Case 2, we can easily see that all bidders have incentives to collude
together. Thus, bidder a and c can suppress bidding from b and d as θ′b = θ
′
d = (0, 0, 0),
and report θ′a = (0 + ε, 0, 0) and θ
′
c = (1, 0 + ε, 0) accordingly. Allocations do not change
but now the seller makes (almost) zero revenue. In the next section, I will show that no
subgroup bidders have incentives to deviate from the grand coalition once it is formed.
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4.3.1 Non-empty core
I ﬁrst present the formal deﬁnition of the collusion game. Denote the allocations under
truthful report as x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n), and payments p
∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n). Let C ⊆ N be a
subgroup of bidders who may decide to collude. The utility of a coalition C when they
bid truthfully is μ∗(C) =
∑
i∈C μi =
∑
i∈C ui(x
∗
i )− p∗i .
If bidders in C decide to manipulate their reports, they can form a simple coalition
such that it is able to reduce the total payments from its members but keep the same
allocations as from truthful reporting, i.e., pCi ≤ p∗i and xCi = x∗i . The aggregate utility
of the coalition is μ′(C) =
∑
i∈C ui(x
∗
i )− pCi .
Deﬁnition 4.1: In an auction market satisfying the assumptions of Section 4.2.1, a collu-
sion game (C, v(C)) is a certain subset of the grand coalition (N, v(N)), C ⊆ N , where
v(C) = μ′(C).
I now turn to analyzing how the coalition can share its gains among the members.
As monetary compensation within a coalition is not explicitly prohibited, the coalition
members can negotiate and redistribute the coalitional gains among themselves regardless
of the initial allocations of the items. A stable coalition can thus be formed in a way that
guarantees no bickering among the colluders, i.e., no subgroup colluders perceive higher
returns from any outside alternatives than their share of the current coalitional gains.
Proposition 4.1: The collusion game always has a non-empty core in the Ausubel’s clinch-
ing auction.
Proof. See Appendix 4.6. 
Proposition 4.1 indicates that even though an auction mechanism (e.g., the Ausubel’s
clinching auction) is capable of preventing manipulation from each individual bidder and
produces eﬃcient allocation outcomes, bidders can still jointly aﬀect the mechanism and
make superﬁcially low payments to the seller (e.g., the grand coalition case in Example
4.1).
Let θC be the vector of reports from each coalition member in C, and μ
′
i(θC ;C) be
i’s utility when her coalition jointly reports some θC other than their true types θ
∗
C .
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Analogous to the strategy-proofness condition targeting individual’s strategic reporting,
I introduce the following condition to address players’ joint incentives of manipulation.
Deﬁnition 4.2: An auction mechanism is group strategy-proof, if ∀ θ ∈ Θ, C ⊆ N , s.t.
(i) μ′i(θC ;C) ≥ μ∗i (θ∗C ;C), ∀ i ∈ C, and (ii) μ′j(θC ;C) > μ∗j(θ∗C ;C), ∃ j ∈ C.
That is, an auction mechanism is group strategy-proof if no subgroup of bidders can
jointly manipulate their reports so that all of them weakly beneﬁt from this manipulation,
while at least one bidder in the subgroup strictly beneﬁts. The group strategy-proofness
condition characterizes the requirement for designing auctions that are able to prevent
bidders’ coalitional incentives.10 However, satisfying the group strategy-proofness con-
dition demands truthful reporting is not strictly dominated for all possible coalitions
C ⊆ N . It thus introduces a large number of incentive-compatibility constraints into the
seller’s objective function, which considerably complicates the design problem (see the
illustration in footnote 9, page 93).
In the next section, I will present a condition that is isomorphic to the group strategy-
proofness but with a relatively simple expression. I also brieﬂy discuss the intrinsic
conﬂicts over diﬀerent design goals of auction mechanisms.
4.4 Non-bossiness
A property that has played an important role in developing the axiomatics of resource
allocation problems is the so-called non-bossiness condition (Satterthwaite and Sonnen-
schein, 1981).11 In brief, it says that whenever a change in a player’s preferences does not
cause a change in her utility, it should not cause a change in others’ utilities. In other
words, a player does not create externalities on others. Non-bossiness seems to be a mild
and reasonable assumption as no one would like to be “bossed around”. In this section,
I will discuss its relation with the group strategy-proofness condition and possible usages
in designing collusion-proofness mechanisms.
10 Notice that if a mechanism is group strategy-proof, then it is clearly strategy-proof. However, the
converse is not necessarily true. The question when strategy-proofness implies group strategy-proofness
has been addressed by Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2009), Barbera` et al. (2010), among others.
11 The non-bossiness condition has widely appeared in the literature on incentive compatibility. See
Thomson (2014) for a comprehensive survey.
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Deﬁnition 4.3: An auction mechanism is non-bossy, if ∀ θ ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ N , μi(θ′i, θ−i) = μi(θ)
implies μ(θ′i, θ−i) = μ(θ).
The following result presents an isomorphic relation between the group strategy-
proofness condition and the non-bossiness condition in auction mechanisms. It also implies
that bidders’ coalitional incentives essentially come from the possible allocation external-
ities.
Observation 1: An auction mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is non-
bossy.
Similar results regarding the relation between non-bossiness and strategy-proofness
can be found in the existing literature on other social choice rules.12 Even though none of
these results have directly addressed the usage of group strategy-proofness in the setting
as I discussed here (i.e., an economy with multiple objects auctioning among players
with quasi-linear utility functions), the proofs are quite similar. I thus omit the proof of
Observation 1 for simplicity.
The following observation further states that the non-bossiness condition is not com-
patible with eﬃcient allocations in ﬁnite auction markets, which reveals some intrinsic
conﬂicts over diﬀerent goals in auction design problems.
Observation 2: In any auction mechanism, if it has an eﬃcient allocation rule, then it is
always bossy.
Recall that the premise of an eﬃcient allocation rule is truthful reporting of private
types from each individual bidder (i.e., the allocation rule is strategy-proof). However,
if one’s utility (i.e., allocations and transfers) depends on her own report, she will report
strategically as long as some non-truthful alternatives are proﬁtable. As in any auction
mechanisms, the allocations are decided either by each bidder’s own report (e.g., the
ﬁrst-price auction in single-unit auction), or by others’ reports (e.g., the second-price
auction).13 All feasible strategy-proof allocation rules have to compute each bidder’s
allocation based on others’ reports, i.e., they are bossy.
12 See, for example, Svensson (1999), Pa´pai (2000) for matching mechanisms (without transfers), and
Goswami et al. (2014) for general exchange economies (with transfers).
13 I exclude the dictatorial allocation rule from my discussions here.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper illustrates the coalition formation processes in a variant of the VCG auction,
the Ausubel’s clinching auction. I claim that the clinching auction is vulnerable to collu-
sion in the sense that it always has a non-empty core. I further argue that a non-bossiness
condition is crucial to such vulnerability. Given the incompatibility between eﬃciency and
non-bossiness, designing a relatively eﬃcient collusion-proofness auction mechanisms with
multiple objects appears to be a nontrivial task for future research.
4.6 Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1 I construct my proof based on two existing results: i) convexity
of v is equivalent to v(C ′ ∪ {i})− v(C ′) ≤ v(C ∪ {i})− v(C), ∀C ′ ⊆ C ⊆ N−i (Driessen,
1988); ii) if a game is convex, it always has a non-empty core (Shapley, 1971). My task
is therefore to show the collusion game is convex.
Notice that with non-increasing marginal values ,the collusion game is monotonic, i.e.
if C ′ ⊆ C then v(C ′) = μ′(C ′) ≤ μ′(C) = v(C). From Deﬁnition 4.1, I have
v(C ∪ {i})− v(C) = μ′(C ∪ {i})− μ′(C)
=
∑
i∈C∪{j}
(
ui(x
∗
i )− pC∪{j}i
)−∑
i∈C
(
ui(x
∗
i )− pCi
)
= uj(xj) +
∑
i∈C
pCi −
∑
i∈C∪{j}
p
C∪{j}
i
I need to show that v(C ′ ∪ {i})− v(C ′) ≤ v(C ∪ {i})− v(C), ∀C ′ ⊆ C ⊆ N−i. This is
equivalent to
uj(xj) +
∑
i∈C′
pC
′
i −
∑
i∈C′∪{j}
p
C′∪{j}
i ≤ uj(xj) +
∑
i∈C
pCi −
∑
i∈C∪{j}
p
C∪{j}
i
Organize the above inequality, we get
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∑
i∈C′∪{j}
p
C′∪{j}
i −
∑
i∈C′
pC
′
i ≥
∑
i∈C∪{j}
p
C∪{j}
i −
∑
i∈C
pCi (4.1)
That is, the payment change of C ′ when adding an additional colluder j is greater
than the corresponding payment change in a larger collusion C, for all C ′ ⊆ C.
Since in an Ausubel’s clinching auction, bidder i’s payment of the z’s item depends
on the residual demand D−i(β), which will be diﬀerent if i stays in diﬀerent coalitions. I
therefore need to analyze the payment diﬀerence for each possible case.
Denote the group of bidders that belong to C but not C ′ as B, B = C\C ′, and D
be the group of “unaﬀected” bidders, D = N\{C ∪ j}. Let m¯j(x) (resp. mj(x)) be j’s
highest (resp. lowest) marginal value, and bS(x) be the ﬁrst losing bid from a subset of
bidders S when a bidder outside S is able to clinch an item, S ⊆ N .
Case (i): m¯j(x) ≤ bD(x), the highest marginal value of j is lower than the ﬁrst losing
bid from the subset of bidders D. Then including j into C will not aﬀect the right-hand-
side (RHS) payment diﬀerence in Equation (4.1). Since the ﬁrst losing bid of a bidder
group cannot be lower than the one from its subgroup (i.e. bD(x) ≤ bD∪B(x)), given
C ′ ⊆ C, the left-hand-side (LHS) is also unaﬀected. In this case, we get the equal sign in
Equation (4.1).
Case (ii): bD(x) ≤ m¯j(x) ≤ bD∪B(x), the highest marginal value of j lies in between
the ﬁrst losing bid in D, and the ﬁrst losing bid in the subset of bidders D ∪ B. Similar
to Case (i), including j will not aﬀect the LHS payment diﬀerence in Equation (4.1).
However, for the RHS, the coalition C can gain from lowing all mj(x) that are larger
than bD(x) to bD(x) + ε after including j, regardless whether j’s smallest marginal value,
mj(x), is lower than b
D(x) or not. This cannot be the case without j. Thus, the payment
diﬀerence
∑
i∈C∪{j} p
C∪{j}
i −
∑
i∈C p
C
i ≤ 0, and Equation (4.1) holds.
Case (iii): bD∪B(x) ≤ m¯j(x), the highest marginal value of j is larger than the ﬁrst
losing bid in D ∪ B. For the LHS of Equation (4.1), similar to the argument for the
payment diﬀerence of C in Case (ii), collusion C ′ ∪ {j} can suppress reports of all mj(x)
that are larger than bD∪B(x) to bD∪B(x) + ε (no matter whether mj(x) is lower than
bD∪B(x) or not). Therefore, the payment diﬀerence of C from including j, is the number
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of j’s marginal values that are larger than bD∪B(x). Similarly, the payment diﬀerence of C
with and without j (i.e., the RHS of Equation (4.1)) is the number of j’s marginal values
that are larger than bD(x). Recall that bD(x) ≤ bD∪B(x) and C ′ ⊆ C, it is clear that the
absolute gain from the collusion C∪{j} (i.e., misreporting all mj(x) ≥ bD(x) to bD(x)+ε)
is larger than the smaller coalition C ′ ∪ {j} (i.e. misreporting all mj(x) ≥ bD∪B(x) to
bD∪B(x)+ ε). Equation (4.1) holds as both sides of Equation (4.1) are now less than zero.
In sum, for any possible marginal value of bidder j, Equation (4.1) is always valid.
This completes the proof. 
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CONCLUSION
This thesis studies the impact of heterogeneous market participants on allocation out-
comes in diﬀerent market mechanisms; in addition, how to design alternative mechanisms
that can more eﬀectively allocate scarce resources with diverse economic and social goals.
Chapter 1 proposes two welfare criteria to evaluate the eﬀective implementation of
aﬃrmative action policies in school choice problems. I characterize two type-speciﬁc
acyclicity conditions in the student optimal stable mechanism withminority reserve policy,
and demonstrate their respective (material) equivalence with the two welfare criteria in
stable matching mechanisms. I further show that type-speciﬁc cycles will gradually vanish
with the increase of the market size.
Chapter 2 studies how ex ante diﬀerences in bidders’ values aﬀect their behavior in two
standard multi-unit auction formats, uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory-
price auction (DPA). I characterize the set of asymmetric monotone Bayes–Nash equilibria
in a simple multi-unit auction game in which two units of a homogeneous object are
auctioned among a set of bidders.
Following Chapter 2, Chapter 3 further investigates and contrasts bidders’ collusion
incentives in the UPA and the DPA when bidders have private information. I claim that
the UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than the DPA in the sense that: 1) a bidder’s
expected payoﬀ is always lower from a larger coalition in a DPA; 2) for a class of all
possible distributions, all coalitions are core-stable in the UPA, whereas only the grand
coalition has a nonempty core in the DPA.
Chapter 4 illustrates the coalition formation processes in a variant of the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves auction, the Ausubel’s clinching auction, in auction markets with multiple
heterogeneous objects. I claim that the clinching auction is vulnerable to collusion in the
sense that it always has a non-empty core. I further argue that a non-bossiness condition
is crucial to such vulnerability.
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